Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1987

Formen Corporation v. Mel Parks : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jackson Howard, Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis and Petersen; Attorneys for Respondents.
Lowell V. Summerhays; Law Offices of Lowell V. Summerhays; Attorney for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Formen Corporation v. Mel Parks, No. 870510 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/706

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BfUfc*

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50

iScKBT NO. S24&&.
DO^^^'

IN T HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STAljE OF UTAH

FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH,
and FRED SMITH,

ffssys- <f/?

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Appeal N^;

2042-6

MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISES,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a
partnership, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY
TAYLOR, his wife, HAL PARKS,
JERRY PARKS, STARLA PARKS (now
STARLA MAYERS), BRYCE AVERILL,
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA
HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS
GENE REID, MARY REID, his wife,
and WANDA HOPPER,
Defendants-Respondents,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment oft the
Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanp>ete County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs

Jackson Howard
Leslie W. Slaugh
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84603

Lowell V. Summerhays
LAW OFFIGES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lak<3 City, Utah 84101

Attorney for
Defendants-Respondents

Attorney for
Plaintiffs-Appellants

DEPOSITED BY THE
STATE OF UTAH

niici A toon

FILED
JUL151985

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH,
and FRED SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Appeal No.

vs.

20426

MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISES,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a
partnership, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY
TAYLOR, his wife, HAL PARKS,
JERRY PARKS, STARLA PARKS (now
STARLA MAYERS), BRYCE AVERILL,
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA
HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS
GENE REID, MARY REID, his wife,
and WANDA HOPPER,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs

Jackson Howard
Leslie W. Slaugh
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84603

Lowell V. Summerhays
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorney for
Defendants-Respondents

Attorney for
Plaintiffs-Appellants

LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to this litigation are listed as follows:

Plaintiffs-Appellants
1.

Formen Corporation, a Utah corporation^

2.

Don Skipworth, and

3.

Fred Smith,

Defendants-Respondents
1.

Mel Parks,

2.

Parks Enterprises, Inc., an Idaho corporation,

3.

Nasky Joint Venture,

4.

Del Taylor,

5.

Nancy Taylor, his wife,

6.

Hal Parks,

7.

Jerry Parks,

8.

Starla Parks (now Starla Ilayers) ,

9.

Bryce Averill,

a partnership,

10.

Harry Keith Huffaker,

11.

Elza Huffaker, his wife,

12.

Thomas Gene Reid,

13.

Mary Reid, his wife, and

14.

Wanda Hopper.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF PARTIES

i

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

19

ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS
ABSENT A SHOWING THAT (1) THE
ACTION WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND (2)
THAT IT WAS NOT BROUGHT OR ASSERTED
IN GOOD FAITH

22

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE, WITHOUT
HEARING ALL EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO
MAKE FACTUAL FINDINGS

24

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND THROUGH FOURTH
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR SLANDER WITHOUT
PRECOGNIZING THE ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE
PRESENTED IN TRIAL AND IN PRE-TRIAL
DISCOVERY

28

THE LOWER COURT WAS IN ERROR TO
ORDER A DECREE OF REFORMATION
SUCH THAT PLAINTIFFS MUST CONVEY
WATER RIGHTS, WHERE DEFENDANTS
CLAIM IS UNFOUNDED AND CANNOT BE
SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTATION

33

THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CROSSCLAIMS
OF DEFENDANTS BRYCE AVERILL, HARRY
KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA HUFFAKER, THOMAS
GENE REID AND MARY REID AGAINST FORMEN
CORPORATION, FOR A REFUND OF MONIES

ii

PAID TO FORMEN CORPORATION, WHERE
SUCH CLAIMS WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, IN IMPROPER
JURISDICTION FOR THIS COURT TO RULE,
AND WHERE THERE EXISTS GENUINE ISSUES
OF MATERIAL FACT

37

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN EVIDENTIARY
RULINGS WHICH WERE PREJUDICIAL WHERE
NUMEROUS OBJECTIONS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL
WERE SUSTAINED AND LIKE OBJECTIONS BY
PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL WERE OVERRULED;
WHERE REVELANT TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WAS NOT ALLOWED TO
BE HEARD; WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS
ALLOWED TO TESTIFY AS AN ADVOCATE FOR
THE DEFENSE POSTURE CONTRARY TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CANON OF ETHICS; AND
WHERE THE VERY NATURE AND NUMBER OF
THESE RULINGS AND COMMENTARY OF THE
COURT FAVORED THE DEFENSE, DEMONSTRATING
BIAS AND PREJUDICIAL COURT RULINGS

48

CONCLUSION

52

TABLE OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1979)

28

Asotin County Court District v. Clarkston
Community Corp. , 436 PT2d 470 (Wash. 1968)

24

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 ,
89 L Ed. 2013, 65 Sup. Ct. 1416

47

Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc., v. National
Association, Etc., 260 F.2d 803, (10th Cir. 1958)
Cady v. Johnson, 671, P.2d 149 (Utah 1983)
California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited,
fU.S. Sup. Ct.,~:972) 92 S.Ct 609, 404 U.S. 508
Campbell v. General Motors Corp.
649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982) . .
Christensen v. Stuchlik, 427 P.2d 278 (Ida. 1967)

iii

. . . 29
22
. . . . 45
25
25

Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
228 P.2d"272 (Ut. 1951)

TT~

30

Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983)

25

Forgett v. Shaff, 3rd Cir. Ct. of App.,
1950-1951, para. 62,000, 610, 181 F.2d 754
Forgett v. Shaff, 1950, 1951 Trade Cases,
para. 62,6T0
Fredrick May & Company v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 266
(Utah 19621

44
44

. . .

38

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)

28

Giboney v. Empire Storage Company, 336 U.S.
490 93 L Ed. 834, 69 Sup. Ct. 684
47
Hales v. Commerical Bank of Spanish Fork,
197 P.2d 910 (Utah 1948)
. . . . .7
31
Knight v. Patterson, 436 P.2d 801, 802 (Utah 1968) . . . . 32
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom,
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) T T T "
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975)

25
. . . 28

Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty,
Ins. Co., 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965)
Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance, Co.,
582 P.2d 1365 (Or. 1978)
United States v. Central Code Apron and Linen Service,
• 1952, 1953 Trade Cases

iv

24
. . 30
27
44

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1•

Did the lower court err in awarding judgment against

the Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, for attorney's fees where
the Defendants failed to prove that the Plaintiffs1 Claim was
"without merit" and "not brought in good faith" as was asserted
by the Defense, and where the claims as presented by the
Plaintiffs were of significant weight and importance having
substantial basis in law and in fact.
2.

Did the lower Court err in granting judgment against

the Plantiffs under rule 41 B at the conclusion of the
Plaintiffs1 case in view of substantial evidence which was
presented in support of Plaintiffs1 First Cause of Action Tortious Interference.
3.

In particular regard to the Plaintiffs1 Second,

Third, and Fourth Causes of Action - Slander, did the lower Court
err in granting Defendants' Motion pursuant to Rule 41(b) to
Dismiss Plaintiffs1 action when Plaintiffs demonstrated
sufficient evidence supported at the trial by the testimony of
numerous witnesses so as to create factual questions based in law
setting forth the validity and merit of Plaintiffs1 Complaint.
4.

Did the lower Court err in awarding judgment on the

Defense Counterclaim for reformation against Formen Corporation
such that water would be provided without cost in accordance with
the terms designated in the Judgment, when the Defendants1 claim
was unfounded and not supported by documentation.
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5.

Did the lower Court err in granting summary judgment

to crossclaimants Bryce Averill, Jerry Keith Huffaker, Eliza
Huffaker, Thomas Gene Reid and Mary Reid, against Formen
Corporation, for a refund of monies paid to Formen Corporation;
was there error in granting summary judgment to crossclaimants
removing Plaintiffs1 cause of action for Injunctive Relief.

In

both cases, Plaintiffs1 claims were supported with genuine issues
of material fact presented in trial and pre-trial discovery.

Was

the granting of summary judgment inappropriate in view of the
Statute of Limitations upon the time in which crossclaimants
could make their complaint, and in light of the jurisdictional
limitations of the Court.
6.

Did the lower Court err in the dismissal of

Plaintiffs1 Fifth Cause of Action for Negligence against
Defendant Mel Parks, and in the dismissal of Plaintiffs1 Sixth
Cause of Action for Antitrust Violations against all Defendants
where the rulings of the Court in pretrial discovery at
depositions prevented Plaintiffs from obtaining relevant
testimony to the above claims, and information important to the
development of Plaintiffs1 case on these issues; there was
applicable and supportive testimony presented at trial on these
points.
7.

Did the lower Court err in making prejudicial

Evidentiary Rulings throughout the course of this action in both
pre-trial and trial rulings.

The Court rulings appeared biased

and prejudiced in allowing Defense objections, denying
Plaintiffs1 objections, preventing testimony in discovery and
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trial, and in allowing Defense Counsel to testify asserting
personal opinions as to the justness of the Plaintiffs1 causes of
action in violation of Rule DR 7-106, Trial Conduct, Canon 7.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was originally commenced in January of 1983
by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants claiming that the
Defendants had conspired against and slandered the Plaintiffs to
such an extent as to significantly prevent the Plaintiffs from
conducting ordinary and common business, and Plaintiffs were
damaged accordingly.

Concurrently, Plaintiffs incorporated in

their complaint a sixth cause of action against all Defendants
for Antitrust Violations.

Plaintiffs sought relief for

wrongfully terminated contracts as a result of the tortious
interference, slander, antitrust violations and actual damages
for resulting sales losses plus interest loss, together with
punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of
Court.
The matter came before the Court, sitting without a
Jury, on Monday, the 27th day of August 1984, before the
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge for Sanpete County, in the
Courtroom of the Sanpete County Courthouse at Manti, Sanpete
County, State of Utah.

At the conclusion of Plaintiffs1 case

Defendants moved to dismiss and the said motion was granted.
Defense witnesses were subsequently called and examined,
particularly in regard to Defense Counterclaims.
submitted without argument.

The matter was

In connection with the counterclaim the Court requested
that the parties provide to the Court the figures representing
the balance which was due on the water contract from Formen
Corporation to Rennert Investment Company on December 31, 1980.
The Court ordered that both sides should submit post
trial memorandum briefs within fifteen days to address the
Defense damage questions as to Attorney's fees and Defendants
claim foe water rights, whereupon the Court stood in recess,
Friday, the 31st day of August, 1984.

The Court Order was set

forth on the 30th day of October, 1984, and the Judgment was
entered and signed by the Court on the 11th day of December,
1984.

(Copies annexed hereto as part of the Addendum.)
The lower Court found that the Plaintiffs1 case was

without merit and lacking in good faith, and Defendants were
awarded Judgment for a Decree of Reformation such that Plaintiffs
must provide water without cost to Parks Enterprises, Inc.

The

Court also ordered Plaintiffs to pay Attorneys fees and costs
amounting to 535,571.80.
It is in response to the decision of the lower court
granting Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment to Foreclosure
Crossclaimants, and granting Defendants1 Motions to Dismiss and
in response to the subsequent Judgment and Order that this
present appeal is now hereby taken by Plaintiffs-Appellants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts were established at trial and are
not in dispute.
-4-

The Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into an agreement
pursuant to which the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Parks
developed a project in Sanpete County, Utah known as Elkridge
Subdivision.

The project was successful and the parties to that

agreement commenced the development of a neighboring project
referred to as Hideaway Valley.

It was in connection with that

project that disputes arose between the Plaintiffs and the Parks,
(Hal Parks, Mel Parks, Parks Enterprises) and Del Taylor and they
entered into a separation agreement pursuant to which executory
contracts, water rights and property ownership was divided.
Parks purchased a neighboring property and commenced action on it
in the sales of lots and named it the Blackhawk Subdivision.
A property owners association was formed to care for and
maintain the common area in Hideaway Valley and purchasers of
lots in Hideaway Valley began to move onto the project and
establish cabins and homes.
According to the Plaintiffs and the allegations set
forth in the Complaint, the Parks, (Mel Parks, Hal Parks, Parks
Enterprises) and Del Taylor, had various meetings with the
remaining Defendants and according to the Plaintiffs embarked
upon a campaign of slander during the process of which
prospective and existing lot purchasers were contacted and
dissuaded from purchasing lots or continuing their lot
purchases.
The Plaintiffs claim that the following testimony
clearly establishes the Defendant's intent to embark upon
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Tortious Interference and Slander; evidence of communications by
which it was carried out and evidence of the direct damages
caused thereby.
Don Skipworth testified at the trial as follows:
A And, at that time, Del Taylor and Mel Parks and Fred
Smith was in a conversation and Fred was asking him
also, "Couldn't we sit down and resolve our
differences," as [sic] Taylor says, "No, we've got
something coming for you."
Q

What did Mr. Smith say?

A He says, "Well what are you going to do shoot me?"
and Del Taylor says, "No, I'm not going to shoot you
but it's a fate worse than death and you will wish you
were dead." (Trial Transcript Page 73 Line 25 to Page
74 Line 8)
That statement was made in early January of 1983.
Mel Parks and Del Taylor invited a group of lot owners
to a meeting at their large family complex on the project on
August 15, 1982 (Trial Transcript Page 76 Lines 1-18)
At that meeting Don Skipworth quoted Bryce Averill as
follows:
A Bryce Averill made the statement that Formen
Corporation was being cheated by Fred Smith on its
charges to Formen Corporation and then Fred Smith and
Max Smith cheated the people on their - - (Trial
Transcript Page 81 Lines 16-19)
Witness Anthony Escobar who was interested in
purchasing a lot in the subdivision was retained by Formen
Corporation to investigate the situation and ask questions of
the Defendants. (Trial Transcript Pag^ 197 Line 13 through Page
198 Line 4)
At the time Fred Smith was a trustee of the
association, Mr. Escobar quoted Elza Huffaker as follows:
-6-

A We were told that they didnft know where the
Association funds were going and that they could not
keep track of the funds or where they were being spent
and so on. (Trial Transcript Page 199, Lines 15-18)
And further as follows:
A. Well, that Fred Smith was trying to buy up all the
water and that nobody -- that it was difficult to get
water and there was not enough water for cabins to be
built on and so forth -- and that I can't -- it was a
while ago but something to do with Clear Water, drilling
and Clear Water and that he was getting overrides from
Clear Water Drilling, or funds returned on Clear Water
Development and Clear Water Drilling. (Trial Transcript
Page 200, Lines 12-19)
And further:
A That the property was recreationally zoned and that
it was difficult to get a building permit. (Trial
Transcript Page 201 Lines 22-23).
Mr. Escobar also spoke with Bryce Averill:
Q

What did he say?

A

That you can't believe anything that they say.

Q

That who says?

A

That Fred Smith says.
(Trial Transcript Page 203, Line 10-14)

When Mr. Escobar stated to Defendants Bryce Averill and
Gene Reid that he was thinking of buying a lot, they made the
following statement:
A Bryce Averill and Gene Ried said, "You don't want to
buy a lot until you find out exactly what you're getting
into," and Gene Reid indicated the same thing and
comments came from all parties to that respect. (Trial
Transcript Page 204, Lines 5-8)
Bryce Averill further stated:
A He indicated that I couldn't -- that I could only
bring in one stick at a time because I can't have any
lumber sitting on the property and that they would make
it difficult for me to build. (Trial Transcript, Page
204, Lines 20-23)
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The testimony of Mr. J. Fred Smith demonstrated
Plaintiff's case for tortious interference and slander.

He

testified that during the spring of 1982 he was informed by Mel
Parks that Mr. Parks had purchased the balance of the Black
Hawk Project and that "because he was cheated on the Hideaway
Valley Project that he was going to put us out of Business."
(Trial Transcript Page 247, Lines 1-11)

Mr. Smith went on to

explain that he remembered those words "Put us out of business"
exactly, and he was "shocked" because at that point he never
even knew there was a problem. (Trial Transcript Page 247, Lines
15-20)
In response to numerous phone calls as a result of the
"More Fireworks" letter, Mr. Smith testified that he expressed
concern to Mel Parks "that what he was spreading around the
country was going to do us some irreparable harm."
Q Now, precisely what did you say to express that
concern?
A I said that we were having some people terminate
their contracts because of what he was allegating and
talking about that we were crooks, cheats, and liars
around the subdivision and to the county officials and
we were losing customers and it was costing us some
money and I insisted that he stop it. (Trial
Transcript Page 262, Lines 9-25)
The harm done to Formen Corporation resulted in a new
category for defining contract cancellations:
Q And what are some of those categories that you fit
those cancellations into?
A Sickness, unemployment, lack of interest, and then
recently the crooks, cheats and liars comments that the
Parks were involved with. (Trial Transcript Page 286,
Lines 1-5)
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Mr. Smith testified that in April of 1981 Mel Parks
said he could do business with him but that "Ted Bradford and
Don Skipworth were crooks, he couldn't stand them and he just
wouldnft do business with them and that he was going to get them
if he could11.
Fred Smith summarized the malicious threats and intent
of Defendant Del Taylor in his testimony as follows:
A Del Taylor said, "Your problems are just beginning."
I says, "Well, the worst you can do is shoot me and
then I'd be out of all the misery", and he says, "We
have" - - Del Taylor says, "We have a fate worse than
death in store for you", and I asked him what that
could possibly be and he left without answering it.
(Trial Transcript Page 306, Lines 10-15)
Witness Louis K. Sharp testified that Del Taylor had
advised him not to pay his Property Owner's Association dues
because Fred Smith was undenaining the Association and misusing
the Association's funds.

(Trial Transcript Page 313, Lines 2-6)

As requested, Mr. Sharp did not pay his dues.

He said that he

"was getting fairly disgusted with the situation of being felt
like I was being caught in the middle of something I wanted no
part of."
Mr. Sharp is no longer an owner in that project
"Because I got tired of paying for a dead horse."
0

Now, when you say "a dead horse" what do you mean?

A

I mean that the property was virtually worthless.

Q

And why was it worthless?

A

Because I could not sell it.

Q

Do you know why you couldn't sell it?

A Because of the rumors, several rumors, that were
floating around. (Trial Transcript Page 314, Lines 313)

This single cancellation represented a net loss to
Forraen Corporation, present and future, of $10,824.40 as
demonstrated in the testimony of Donald Ray Skipworth. (Trial
Transcript Page 558, Line 6)
Witness Gary Christiansen testified that he was
thinking of buying a lot in the Plaintiffs1 project and that he
spoke to Defendant Bryce Averill and told him that. (Trial
Transcript Page 514, Lines 7-11)

Whereupon Defendant Bruce

Averill said:
To the best of my recollection was that Fred Smith was a
liar and never kept his promise, you could never get a
land deed, and you could never get any water rights from
him and about that time I got a little mad and I didn't
say anything but I paid for our breakfast and left to
finish my job and I drove to Fred's property. (Trial
Transcript Pge 514, Lines 15-20)
Mr. Christiansen decided not to buy a lot. (Trial
Transcript page 515, Lines 5-15)
Witness Brad Craig testified that Mrs. Gene Reid
(Defendant Mary Reid) told him the Plaintiffs couldn't deliver
water rights they had purportedly sold to Mr. Craig.
Q What did you say and what did Mrs. Reid say on that
occasion?
A Well, the occasion started when we were talking
about our lots and they were next to each other, and I
had purchased some water rights. They told me they had
no right to sell any water rights because Formen
Corporation did not have any water rights to sell me.
Q

Who said that?

A Mrs. Gene Reid.
(Trial Transcript page 528, Line 22 to Page 529, Line
10)
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Further:
A Mrs. Gene Reid said that Fred and Max Smith were
liars and cheats and that anything they did for the
subdivision that they were pocketing the money. . (Trial
Transcript Page 529, Lines 18-20)
Witness Craig further testified:
Q

What did you say and what did Mr. Averill say?

A Well, we were talking about the lots and what was
going on up there and he told me that Formen
Corporation was nothing but a scam to get people's money
and that their main objective was to foreclose as soon
as they had possible time to do and they were liars and
cheats, (Trial Transcript Page 530, Lines 7-14)
Further:
Q Did Mr. Averill ever mention anything to you about
the deed to your land?
A Yes, he did. He also said that I couldn't get a
deed to my land even if I did pay for it. (Trial
Transcript Page 530 Lines 18-23)
Frank Pino, a lot owner in Hideaway Valley, testified
that Defendant Del Taylor (at a meeting also attended by
Defendant Mel Parks and Mr. Taylor's father-in-law) told him
that Plaintiff Fred Smith was wrongfully taking money from the
homeowners association.

He testified as follows:

Q What did Mr. Taylor say on that occasion?
A Well, not to pay my assessments and that Fred Smith
was high on his prices and on his equipment.
Q Was the subject o*r vhat would happen on the
assessment money discussed?
A Yes. They said Formen Corporation and Fred Smith was
taking all the money and not to do anything. (Trial
Transcript Page 544, Line 2 3 to Page 545, Line 4)
Witness Pat Ilounteer testified that she terminated her
lot purchase because of all the problems that existed at the
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subdivision and specifically that she, as the secretary for the
association, was not able to participate in meetings as of
interference at at least one meeting from Del Taylor, (Trial
Transcript Page 441, Line 23 through Page 442, Line 6)
Witness Leslie Wallace Roach testified that as a result
of receiving Exhibit 35 in the mail, and similar correspondence,
that he terminated his contract.
this brief as an exhibit.
by the Defendants.)

(Exhibit 35 is attached to

This was a letter composed and sent

(Trial Transcript Page 434, Line 6 through

Page 435, Line 14)
Witness LaMar Macklin stated that he resigned from his
position as trustee of the Property Owners Association as a
result of derogatory comments about Formen Corporation made by
Mr. Taylor at the Property Owners Association meeting,

(Trial

Transcript Page 500, Line 25 through Page 501, Line 12)
Certified Public Accountant Frank Stuart testifed
regarding damages and introduced Exhibit 46 which was admitted
into evidence.
The Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that the
slander and tortious interference commenced in May of 1982. The
Court restrained the Defendants from slandering the Plaintiffs
on February 2, 1983.
Exhibit 46 shows that sales for the Plaintiff Formen
Corporation were 215 lots for 1981 with 33 cancellations.
Exhibit 46 shows that sales for 1982 were 95 with 68
cancellations.

Exhibit 46 shows monthly sales during this

relevant period as follows:
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1983

1982
January-

3

February
March
April
May

2
5
12
11 (Alleged Inception
of slander and
tortious interference

June
July
August
September
October
November
December

18

8
Injunction
16
24
11

4
9
11
6

8
6
From the foregoing it can be seen that sales fell off

shortly after the alleged inception and increased immediately
after the injuction.
Mr. Stuart using the 1981, 1982 and 1983 figures
testified that in his opinion the Plaintiffs were damaged in the
amount of $3,600,000.00 (Trial Transcript, Page 401, Lines 1-5)
The rulings of the Court can best be demonstrated in
fact by the actual record of the Transcript of Preceedings of
Trial wherein Plaintiffs were prevented from questioning
witnesses as to relevant information in support of their
concerns.
As to speculative testimony, Plaintiffs1 Counsel
objected to Defense questioning, Tr. Vol. I, page 114;
Objection Overruled.
As to the assumption of facts not in evidence,
Plaintiffs' Counsel objected to Defense questioning, Tr. Vol. I,
Page 145; Objection Overruled.
As to Plaintiffs1 Objection to Defense Questioning,
regarding the assumption of a fact belied by all of the evidence,

-13-

Tr. Vol. I, page 179; Objection Overruled.
As to Plaintiffs1 Objection to Belaboring Questioning,
Tr. Vol. I, page 184; Objection Overruled.
There is a question as to whether the lower Court had
already made up its mind in this matter prior to hearing the
evidence.

Regarding a question of reading language which could

possibly be construed to be slanderous, the Court said:
Just jump over the language and let the Supreme Court
read it if they want to.
Tr. Vol. I, page 233, lines 9 and 10.
Plaintiffs1 Objection to irrelevent information was
overruled, Tr. Vol 1. page 233, lines 15 through 19.
As to Defense Objections as to Plaintiffs1 questioning
regarding applications on file with the Court, Defense
objections were Sustained and Plaintiffs1 witness was unable to
testify as to any implications of the application, Tr. Vol II,
pages 245 and 246.
The Defense motion to strike relevant commentary in
response to Plaintiffs1 questioning regarding title report and
title opinion claims was sustained and the answer remains barred
from the record, Tr. Vol II., pages 253, 254.
The next few questions were also objected to by Defense
Counsel, and sustained by the lower Court. The following
discussion occurred:
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, for the record, we would
profer an additional line of questions on the same
subject and I assume that the objections would be
similar and you would rule the same way.
THE COURT: Don't assume anything, Counsel. I don't
want you assuming anything. You try the case like you
feel and I111 rule like I feel I should rule and then,

if somebody's made a mistake, it will be on the record.
Tr. Vol. II, page 254, lines 17 through 24.

Defense Objection was sustained upon testimony vital to
Plaintiffs1 case.

Plaintiffs1 counsel explained as follows:

MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, this is a critical
evidentiary issue in our case and Mr. Smith, as the
President of the company, is entitled to testify
regarding general business conditions that affect his
company. Now, you know, we've had numerous
communications with people complaining that so-and-so
said so-and-so and I do have a hearsay problem, but we
think clearly that Mr. Smith is entitled, if he gets a
barrage of telephone calls and arguments to merely
reflect the condition that existed in his business as a
result of the statement by the Defendants... (Tr. Vol.
II. page 257, lines 14-24)
The discussion continued, culminating with:
MR. SUMMERHAYS: We have the burden to summarize the
business conditions for Formen. We are having a number
of witnesses come in and I think we will burden the
Court even with the number we have but on each episode
they stirred up tremendous impact on the business,
tremendous numbers of communications. We can't bring in
hundreds and hundreds of people to describe all of
that.
THE COURT:

The objection is sustained, Counsel.

Another such instance occurred Tr. Vol. II, page 269,
page 270, where Defendants Objected to critical information
perceived by Plaintiffs to be relevant and not hearsay. The Court
said "I don't see how it's relevant.

Maybe I'm mistaken."

Plaintiffs' counsel explained that it is necessary to lay a
foundation to show what business events occurred during the
episode of slander.

Nevertheless, the Court Sustained Defense

Objection that "it's immaterial, irrelevant and hearsay".
Plaintiffs' counsel asked (Tr. Vol. II, page 283, lines
4 and 5) "how many projects have you developed as of that point?"

Objection by Defense was sustained.

Plaintiffs1 counsel asked

next (Tr. Vol II, page 183, lines 13 and 14) "do you have an
opinion, Mr. Smith, as to why your sales were down in '82?"

This

objection was also sustained.
From this point on there were repeated Objections to
Plaintiffs1 questioning which were likewise Sustained.
Objection was made and sustained as to Plantiffs
questioning sales levels following the appropriate foundational
questioning. See Tr. Vol. I, pages 288 through 289, which reads
as follows:
Q Now, you normally have high sales. Do you know or
can you give us any reason to explain why your sales
plummented in July of 1982, and continued low throughout
that summer?
A.

Yes.

MR. HOWARD:

Objection, no foundation laid.

MR. SUMMERHAYS: Well, it's right there, Your Honor, in
front of us.
THE COURT:

The objection's sustained.

MR. SUMMERHAYS:
ruling?

May I get the grounds for the Court1s

THE COURT: I don't think there's any foundation for it,
Counsel. I think it becomes just so remote.
MR. SUMMERHAYS: That he can't explain why he thinks his
sales went down?
THE COURT: Well, I think he's got to have a basis. I
don't think he can come up with an assumption because of
the graph that he had run out on the computer.
Plaintiffs were unable to present testimony and to have
pertinent exhibits accepted by the lower Court.

Objections

followed the entire line of questioning which was necessary to
lay foundation, and to demonstrate the very concerns raised which

eventually necessitated the initiation of this litigation.
Similar rulings and courtroom misunderstandings will be found in
Tr. Vol. II. pages 294, 295, 297, 298, and 299.
The extent of the Defense barrage of objections is
exemplified as follows:
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, Ifm going to object to the
conversation regarding rumors. It may very well be that
rumors were floating around but that doesnft -MR. SUMMERHAYS:
conversation.
MR. HOWARD:
advance.

He hasn't said anything about i

I just want to make my objection in

Tr. Vol. II, page 314, lines 14 through 20.
The same grounds upon which the Court sustained Defense
objections to questioning regarding documents as to the best
evidence, are the grounds upon which the Court overruled
Plaintiffs1 objections for the same reason.

(Tr. Vol. II, page

323)
Another example of court bias in rulings is demonstrated
in Tr. Vol II, page 325, lines 16 through 19:
MR. SUMMERHAYS: We'll object, Your Honor, it's
repetitious and it's also immaterial; that's immaterial
here on that line of questioning.
THE COURT:

The objection's overruled.

Similar examples followed in Tr. Vol. II, pages 331,
333, 338, and 355.
Defense objections were sustained as to the line of
questioning setting forth damage cases to be relied upon in
support of the economist's testimony as to Plaintiffs' damages.
(Tr. Vol. II, page 386, lines 2 through 10.)
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In Tr. Vol. II, pages 469 through 479 the line of
questioning from Plaintiffs1 counsel to Mr. Ross Blackham,
Sanpete County Attorney, was objected to by Defense counsel and
sustained by the Court.
and immaterial testimony.

The objection was that it was irrelevant
Plaintiffs1 counsel endeavored to

explain the very important relevance of this testimony to the
Court.

It was critical to Plaintiffs1 response to Defense

Counter-claim to show that Plaintiffs1 actions were within the
boundaries of law and order.

Defendants had alledged that

Plaintiffs had improperly developed and sold unregistered
property in violation of the zoning ordinance, which is a
criminal offense.

To accuse someone of a criminal action where

there was no criminal activity is to Slander someone.

Plaintiffs

were in this instance not allowed to present relevant testimony
as to the legality of their actions.

This Court ruling may have

been predicated upon pre-existing bias as reflected in Tr. Vol.
II, page 479, lines 13 through 22 which went as follows:
THE COURT: I love you, Mr. Blackham, but I just don't
care what you think.
A

Thank you.
(Witness Excused).

THE COURT: And I can tell you that Mr. Blackham doesn't
care what I think most of the time.
Now, have you decided whether you want to call him or
not?
MR. SUMMERHAYS:

I don't want to call him, Your Honor.

In Tr. Vol. Ill, page 518 through 522, Plantiffs1
counsel was not allowed to ask questions demonstrating the impact
in the community of the effect of the slander which is one of the
-18-

elements Plaintiffs need to show in a Slander case.

On page 523

Defense Objections were Sustained such that Plaintiffs1 counsel
could not ask questions regarding water title*

On page 524

Defense Objection was Sustained as to questioning regarding bad
On page 534 Plaintiffs1 objections were overruled as

feelings.

to Defense counsel suggestions to the witness and as to
repetitious and harassing questioning.
It is clear that the weight of the Court's pr*judicial
evidentiary rulings, as demonstrated in the above facts, favored
the Defendants by the very nature of the rulings barring
Plaintiff's case presentation.

The transcript of the pre-trial

deposition of Mel Parks, taken before the Court, will reveal many
additional such ruling indicative of a predisposition and
prejudice on the part of the Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The lower court erred in awarding Attorney's Fees,
office and court costs totalling $35,571.80 to the Defense where
Defendants failed to prove bad faith on the part of the
Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs instituted the proceedings in this matter

with good faith, and with the belief that they were damaged by
the wrongdoings of the Defendants.

From the time of the

initiation of this suit, through discovery and through the trial,
Plaintiffs have contended that they were wronged by the
Defendants, and in good faith, they attempted to prove their
damages.

Plaintiffs have spent a good deal of time, effort and
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money in the furtherance of their cause, and would not have done
so if it were not with the belief that they were entitled to the
relief sought in their pleadings.
The lower court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs1 causes
of action for Tortious Interference and for Slander since the
court mistakenly concluded, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs
had failed to prove a prima facia case either on liability or on
damages, that Plaintiffs had not proven any tortious interference
from the evidence the Court heard, that Plaintiffs had not proven
any slander, malice, or falsity, and that Plaintiffs1 damages
were so general and speculative as to not be worthy of
consideration.
The lower court erred in awarding judgment to Defendants
for reformation of the "Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution
Agreement11 which agreement was previously entered into on the
31st day of December, 1980, and which agreement was properly
executed and attested to by parties of both parts, which
agreement speaks for itself and was established well prior to the
initiation of this litigation, and which agreement is in and of
itself a document setting forth the contractual rights and
understandings of both parties for the very purpose of defining
rights so as to prevent this type of misunderstanding.
The above matters are questions of fact and of law which
were supported in evidence, much of which was not allowed to be
heard at the trial.

Further, the Court seemed to have held

written contractual agreements as inconsequential as to assumed
understandings of what ought to be.
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The lower Court improperly granted Summary Judgment to
crossclaimiant, foreclosure Defendants where genuine issues of
material fact should have been tried rather than ruled on in a
motion, and where there are factual questions as to the Court's
jurisdiction and as to Defendants1 violations of the Statute of
Limitations.
The extent to which the Court did not hear supportive
evidence was largely due to the Court's evidentiary rulings
preventing Plaintiffs1 case from being heard.

Initially the

lower Court, in presiding for the taking of the deposition of Mel
Parks, prevented testimony by sustaining Defense objections such
that Plaintiffs were unable to develop the facts in support of
their claims for negligence against Defendant Mel Parks; and
concurrently Plaintiffs were prevented from obtaining testimony
corroborating their case of Antiturst Violations.

Nevertheless,

there are substantial facts presented for review in this appelant
brief to show cause why Plaintiffs complaint for Antiturst
Violations should have been heard at the trial.
The lower Court was incorrect to have erroneously
excluded testimony upon relevant questioning which was repeatedly
objected to by Defense Counsel, and repeatedly sustained by the
Court.

Similar objections by Plaintiffs1 Counsel were frequently

overruled.

The rulings of the lower court were predictably

consistent and served to preclude Plaintiffs case from being
heard while admitting Defense testimony notwithstanding
Plaintiffs objections and rights.

Further, the lower Court

allowed Defense Counsel to render prsonal opinion in trial
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testimony as the merit and intent of Plaintiff's Complaint in
violation of the Canon of Ethics.

ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANT
ABSENT A SHOWING THAT (1) THE
ACTION WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND (2)
THAT IT WAS NOT BROUGHT OR ASSERTED
IN GOOD FAITH.
This Court has recently interpreted UCA 78-27-56 in an
opinion by Justice Howe, Cady v. Johnson, 671 P2d. 149 (Utah
1983).

The Court stated at page 151:
This statute is narrowly drawn. It was not meant to be
applied to all prevailing parties in all civil suits.
To safeguard against too broad an application, two
elements are required in addition to being prevailing
party. First, the claim must be "without merit.". . *
In addition to finding the claim to lack merit, the
trial court must also find that plaintiffs1 conduct in
bringing suit was lacking in good faith.
The Court stated at page 151 that the term without merit

implies boardering on frivolity and this meant "of little weight
or importance having no basis in law or fact."
The "factual posture of the record shows that there is
ample and substantial basis in law and in fact to support the
proposition that Plaintiffs claim were not without merit.

The

discussions found under the topic of tortious interference and
slander fully demonstrated this.
The facts set forth, supra, prove the following
propositions:
1.

That the Defendants expressed an intent to damage

the Plaintiffs.

2.

That the Defendants made numerous statements to

third persons to the effect that Plaintiffs were crooks, cheats
and liars.
3.

That the Defendants tried to take Plaintiffs'

customers,
4.

That the Defendants contacted numerous regulatory

and governmental bodies seeking sanctions against Plaintiffs,
all of the which were found to be without merit as no sanctions
were sought or enforced.
5.

That Plaintiffs sales substantially decreased

commencing at a time when the slander started and substantially
increased immediately after the issuance of the injunction.
Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the
Plaintiffs case was without basis in law or tact.
In Cady, this court adopted the Warlington definition of
good faith as:
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activites
in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable
advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge
of the fact that the activites in question will, [sic]
hinder, delay or defraud others.
This court held in Cady, that an award of attorneys fees
against Plaintiff under the foregoing definition was improper.
Justice Howe stated at page 152:
In the instant case, the trial court found lack of good
faith because had plaintiffs researched the issue as
instructed at pretrial conference, they would have
discovered they had not vaild claim and they could have
saved the court valuable time by avoiding trial.
We disagree that their conduct constitutes bad faith.
Plaintiffs were clearly pursuing a meritless claim and
better preparation might well have disclosed that to
them. However, that conduct does not rise to lack of
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good faith. The evidence must also affirmatively
establish a lack of at least one of the three elements
of good faith heretofore discussed.
In this case Plaintiffs-Appellants have a much stronger
case than the Plaintiffs did in Cady and there is no evidence
whatsoever to affirmatively establish a lack of at least one of
the three elements of the Cady definition.
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE, WITHOUT
HEARING ALL EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO
MAKE FACTUAL FINDINGS.
The lower court dismissed Plaintiffs1 case at the
conclusion of its evidence.

It is fundamental that before a

dismissal should be ordered the lower court must consider the
contentions of Plaintiffs in a light most favorable to them and
should resolve any doubts as to that right of recovery by
permitting full trial.

Reliable Furniture Co. v Fidelity &

Guaranty Ins. Co., 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965).

Amotion to dismiss

for insufficiency of evidence which is made at the close of
Plaintiffs case admits the truth of evidence and all reasonable
inferences arising therefrom and the court must consider such
evidence most strongly in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
defendant.

Asotin County Court District v Clarkston Community

Corp., 436 P.2d 47G (Wash. 1968).
A dismissal on a motion at the conclusion of Plaintiffs1
case is indistinguishable in operation and effect from a motion
for a directed verdict where a jury is present.
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Christensen v

Stuchlik, 427 P.2d 278 (Ida 1967).

This Court has on many

occasions stated that in reviewing a motion for a directed
verdict the trial court may not waive the evidence but must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the motion is directed.

Cruz v Montoya, 660 P.2d

723 (Utah 1983).
In determining whether Plaintiff's evidence is
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, a trial court may
not weigh the evidence or consider credibility of witnesses but
the evidence most favorable to the Plaintiff must be accepted as
true and conflicting evidence must be completely disregarded.
Campbell v General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982).
Applying these basic fundamental rules of review shows
that the lower Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' case.

The

testimony introduced by Plaintiffs for their first cause of
action, Tortious Interference, was in total compliance with the
guidelines set forth in the Utah Supreme Court case of Leigh
Furniture and Carpet Co., v Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Ut. 1982),
whereby the Utah Supreme court recognized a common law cause of
action for "intentional interference with prospective economic
relations".

In that case, the court indicated that a prima facia

cause of action for tortious interference would lie if the
Plaintiff could show

,f

(1) that the Defendant intentionally

interfered with the Plaintiff's existing or potential economic
relations; (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means; (3)
causing injury to the Plaintiff."

All of these points were

demonstrated by the Plaintiffs in trial as evidenced on the
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record of the transcript of proceedings in the lower Court and
are set forth within this appellant brief by the nature of the
Statement of the Facts.
In the Leigh Funiture case, the court elaborated on the
subject of improper means.

In its discussion of improper

purpose it noted that:
...[i]n the rough and tumble of the marketplace,
competitors inevitably damage one another in the stuggle
for personal advantage. The laws offer no remedy for
those damages
even if they are intentional—because
they are an inevitable byproduct of competition.
Problems inherent in proving motivation or purpose make
it prudent for commerical conduct to be regulated for
the most part, by the improper means alternative, which
typically requires only a showing of particular
conduct.
The alternative or improper purpose will be
satisfied where it can be shown that the actor's
predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff.
Leigh Furniture 657 P.2d at 307.
The subjective intent of a person is difficult to
discern and even more difficult to prove. Still in this case,
there is ample evidence that the Defendants intended to damage
the Plaintiffs1 business relations for the sole purpose of doing
harm and injury to the Plaintiffs and not out of an intent to
obtain competitive advantage in business affairs.
Some of the acts of the Defendants showing their Tialice,
ill will, and improper purpose toward the Plantiffs are set
forth in this appellant brief Statements of Facts Section.
Even if it cannot be proved that the Defendants1
purpose was to harm and injure the Plaintiff rather than to
obtain a competitive business advantage, the Plaintiffs may
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still recover by showing that the Defendants used improper means
to interfere with the Plaintiffs1 business relations:
The alternative requirement of improper means is
satisfied where the means used to interfere with a
party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as
violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized
common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or tortious in
themselves and hence interference,
Leigh Furniture, 657 P2d at 308 (Citations omitted)•

The court

went on to give some specific examples of things that would be
considered "improper" and said, quoting Top Service Body Shop,
Inc., vs. Allstate Insurance Co., 582 P.2d 1365 (Or. 1978),
"Commonly included among improper means are violence, threats or
other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, briber,
unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood."
Leigh Funriture, 657 P.2d at 308 (Emphasis added).
There is ample evidence demonstrated in the Statement of
Facts to support a finding by the trier of fact that the improper
means employed by the Defendants included threats or other
intimidation, misrepresentation, defamation and disparaging
falsehood.

It is therefore clear that the second requirement of

a cause of action for tortious interference is shown, if not by
the Defendants1 malice as improper purpose, at least by the
Defendants1 use of improper means.
The Plaintiffs have suffered damage which is unequivical
and supported by substantial documentary evidence (see Statement
of Facts).

Certainly, there is no question that the Plaintiffs

can show that they have been damaged by the Defendant.
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ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND THROUGH FOURTH
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR SLANDER WITHOUT
RECOGNIZING THE ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE
PRESENTED IN TRIAL AND IN PRE-TRIAL
DISCOVERY.
Utah recognizes slander per se where the Defendant
defames an individual using words that, among other things,
charge "criminal conduct" or charge "conduct that is incompatible
with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, or
office."

Allred vs. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 320 (Ut. 1979).

slander per se is established, harm is presumed.
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Ut. 1975).

When

Prince vs.

While some states have

adopted the negligence standard established in Gertz vs. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.

323 (1974) in all cases, Utah has never

abandoned the common-law application of strict liability for
defamation in a case involving a non-media Defendant and a
private Plaintiff.

There is no requirement of showing malice or

that the Defendant's intended to defame the Plaintiffs.

The

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover proved damages upon showing
that the Defendants libeled them and that the Plaintiffs suffered
an injury thereby.

General or presumed damages and punitive

damages may be recovered by the Plaintiff by showing actual
malice on the part of the Defendant.

Allred, 590 P. 2d at 322,

323.
The case at hand clearly falls under the rubric of
slander per se.

In the case of Prince vs.

Peterson, 538 P.2d

1325 (Ut. 1975), the Plaintiff was attempting to sell his
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business when he discovered that the Defendant was telling
prospective buyers and others that the Plaintiff was crooked and
dishonest in his business dealings and was cheating his owT
children.

In a letter to a prospective buyer of the Plaintiffs1

business, the Defendant called the Plaintiff a "clever crook" and
"If words of that character are used in such a context
or under such circumstances, they would reasonably be
understood to come within the traditional requirement of
libel or slander: that is, to hold a person up to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injur him in his
business or vocation, they are deemed actionable per se;
and the law presumes that damages will be suffered
therefrom."
Prince, 528 P.2d at 1328.
In the present case, the Defendants have called the
Plaintiffs "crooks, cheats and liars" and have opened them up to
hatred, contempt and ridicule in a way that has injured the
Plaintiffs in their business and vocations.

(See Statement of

Facts.
All of these statements are actionable in and of
themselves, nothing else needs to be shown except that these
words were spoken and the Plaintiffs suffered an injury as a
result of them.

If there is any question as to whether or not

these statements are defamtory, the Plaintiff is entitled to have
a jury decide:
Only when the Court can say that the language is not
reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot
be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense, that
the Court can rule as a matter of law that it is not
defamatory." Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc., vs. National
Association, Etcl, 260 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1958).
Clearly, however, the evidence goes beyond the bare
minimum requirements for actionable slander.
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There is no more

than sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could find
that the statements were motivated by malice and ill will, as
such the Plaintiffs are entitled to general damages and puntive
damages.
The Defendants claim that there is a privilege based on
the First Amendment to make defamatory statements to public
officials and cite Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) as authority for this proposition.
case is inapposite.

The Sierra Club

The holding in that case was simply that a

Plaintiff injured by a change in the government's policy effected
by legitimate efforts on the part of the Defendant could not
maintain an action for damages resulting from that change in
policy.

This is nothing in the Sierra Club case which indicates

that the Defendants defamed the Plaintiff and were not held
liable for that defamation.

The privilege of petitioning the

government for redress does not carry with it the unfettered
right to make false and damaging statements about a private
party.

To follow the Defendant's argument to its logical

extreme would allow a person to use government channels to
malign and injure a fellow citizen by falsehood and slander with
absolute impunity.

The Defendant's agrument suggests that the

libel and slander are permissible if the recipient is government
official.
The Defendants also claim that their statements were
conditionally privileged because they shared a common interest
with the buyers and prospective buyers.

The case of Combes v.

Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (Ut. 1951) explains Utah's
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doctrine of conditional privilege.

In that case the Utah

Supreme Court cited with approval the of Hales v. Commerical
Bank of Spanish Fork, 197 P2d 910 (Ut. 1948) which adopted the
Restatement of Torts Sec. 594:
An occasion is conditionally privileged when the
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief
that (a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently
important interest of the publisher, and (b) the
recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be
of service in the lawful protection of the interest.
The Court went on to explain that the requirement was "for the
purpose of safeguarding against too wide-spread, careless or illadvised inquiry under the protection of the cloak of conditional
privilege...11 Combes, 228 P.2d at 275.
So something more than good faith and an interest in
common with the other is required for a conditional privilege to
attach.

It is required that the publisher have a protectable

interest and that the recipient be able, somehow, to aid in
protecting that interest.

In order for the Defendant to claim

conditional privilege they must show that they had an interest in
the matter which they correctly or reasonably believed could be
protected by their publication of the defamatory matter.

The

Defendants have failed to show any such relationship with those
to whom they published the defamatory statements.
While at first glance it may appear that the meeting of
the owner's association of the Hideaway properties falls under
the conditional privilege, in fact, those who were actively
telling the other owners untruths such as that Forraen Corporation
and Fred Smith were unable to convey title or obtain a well

-31-

permit did not have an interest that could be protected by the
publication of defamatory matter.

Some of those parties such as

Del Taylor and Mel parks had already received their deeds and
obtained their well permits.

As such, they had no interest

sufficiently important to them to publish defamatory materials.
Furthermore, the statements made at the meetings were
not made only to proper persons.

The Utah Supreme Court in

Knight v. Patterson, 436 P.2d 801, 802 (Ut. 1968), quoting 33
Am.Jur. 126 explained the doctrine of conditional privilege as
follows:
The essential elements of a conditionally privileged
communication may accordingly be enumerated as good
faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in
its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and
publication to proper parties only.
Knight, 436 P.2d at 802 (Emphasis added).

At these meetings were

Arlon Fox, Jim Norlander and numerous others, non-owners who
could in no way help the Defendant's maintain any purported
interest.

As such they were improper parties to receive

defamatory matter under a conditional privilege.
Even if we assume, inspite of the above, that the
statements made at the owner's association meetings were
conditionally privileged, that would not make other defamatory
statements not made at those meetings conditionally privileged.
Most of the defamatory statements were made at other than
association meetings.
Even if the Defendants could remedy this situation and
somehow show that they were conditionally privileged in making
the defamatory statements, that privilege requires that the
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publication be made in good faith and only to the extent
necessary.

See Knight v. Patterson, 436 P.2d at 802.

As already

mentioned there is more than enough evidence on which a trier of
fact could find that the Defendant's acts were motivated by
malice and ill-will.

"It is sufficient to say that qualified

privilege is inconsistent with the existence of express or
actual malice."

Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc., 260 F.2d at 808.

As such any privilege which the Defendants might be able to show
is destroyed by their lack of good faith and their malice and
ill-will in making the publication.
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT WAS IN ERROR TO ORDER A
DECREE OF REFORMATION SUCH THAT PLAINTIFFS
MUST CONVEY WATER RIGHTS, WHERE DEFENDANTS
CLAIM IS UNFOUNDED AND CANNOT BE SUPPORTED
BY DOCUMENTATION.
The documentation does not support Defendants' claims
for water rights against the Plaintiffs.

On May 1, 1978, Formen

Corporation and Parks Enterprises Inc. (consisting of some of the
Defendants herein) entered into a joint venture agreement a copy
of which is appended hereto.

The joint venture agreement was

entered into by and among the parties for the purpose of
developing and selling recreational property known as Elkridge
Ranches.

Contained in section two of that joint venture

agreement is the provision for water.

This portion of the

agreement Is quoted as follows:
Formen agrees to provide water rights to the parcels as
they are sold on a as needed basis and further agrees to
indeminify and hold Parks harmless from any liabilities
resulting from the insufficiency of providing such water
for the tract of parcel thereof.
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In the event that Forraen defaults under the terras of
this agreement or in the event this venture shall not be
completed or terminated short of its time, Formen does
hereby grant to Parks the right to assume their position
in the purchase contract with Rennert wherein Parks will
acquire the water rights by completing the payments of
the contract, said payments not to exceed the original
purchase price of $75,000,00.
In accordance with the terms and provisons of the
contract as set forth herein above, in the event that the joint
venture agreement is terminated Parks will have the option to
purchase the water necessary for their lots.
Section IX "Termination" of the joint venture agreement
sets forth the provisions as follows:
In the event of termination of this agreement all
liabilities of the joint venture shall be paid and all
unsold parcels and those held in default of sales
contract shall be distributed to Parks by the trustee
holding title to the same. Parks shall have the right
to acquire the water rights pertaining to said parcels
at a price equal to Formen1s cost.
According to this provision Parks was given the rights
to acquire the water rights by purchasing the same from Formen
at Formen1s cost on all unsold parcels and those held in default
at the time of any termination.
On December 31, 1980, a Memorandum of Partnership
Dissolution Agreement, appended hereto, was signed by Formen
Corporation and Parks Enterprises, Inc. terminating their
contractual relationship and thereby effectuating the provisions
set forth in the joint venture agreement pertaining to
termination of the same.

It was at the time of termination the

Parks Enterprises, Inc. was then given the option to purchase the
water rights by completing the payments of the contract as set
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forth in the provisions of the joint venture agreement.

Parks

Enterprises has not availed itself to the remedies contained in
those termination provisions in the joint venture agreement and
they have not as yet offered to purchase the water rights as set
forth therein.

it has been the Defendants1 position that these

water rights should be given to them free and clear and without
consideration.

However, there are no contractual obligations for

the Plaintiffs to convey water rights to the Defendants without
payment for the same.

The Defendants have referred to minutes of

the meeting which was held on April 28, 1981, between Parks
Enterprises and Formen Corporation.

These minutes have been

attested to as being an accurate and correct reflection of the
meeting which took place on that date.

The record of the meeting

does not reflect that the water rights were an issue in that
meeting and indeed the Defendants testified at the time of trial
that the water rights were not discussed at the meeting as they
had been covered in the joint venture agreement.

In reviewing

the exhibits that were submitted at time of trial which reflect
the meeting held on that date it is clearly shown that the
understanding by and among the parties thereto was that water
rights were not an issue at that time as the issue had been
covered completely and sufficiently in the termination provisions
of the joint venture agreement.
At the time of the dissolution of the partnership
between the parties hereto a special warranty deed was executed
by the parties and issued to Parks Enterprises conveying to them
certain parcels of land in Elkridge and in Hideaway Valley.
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This

conveyance was done pursuant to the terms and provisions of the
Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution Agreement and in accordance
with the termination provisions of the joint venture agreement.
These deeds are dated May 25, 1982 and Janaury 13, 1981,
respectively.

The Special Warranty Deeds containing the property

conveyed to Parks Enterprises, Inc., contain only real property
and are void of any mention of water rights.

This was done

according to the provisions as set forth by and among the parties
at the time of the dissolution of the agreement and all parties
at the time conveyance were in agreement that water rights were
not to be conveyed but were to be handled in accordance with the
provisions of the joint venture agreement.
Therefore, the Defendants should be denied their claims
for the conveyance of water rights without proper consideration
to wit: payment of the contractual obligations as set forth in
the termination provisions of the joint venture agreement.

The

documents and deeds signed by the parties hereto accurately
reflect the intent of the parties in conveying only property to
the land which is set forth on the respective deeds.

The intent

of the parties was that water would be conveyed upon puchase of
the same from Plaintiffs by the Defendants.

Absent showing of

intent otherwise the Defendants should be denied their claim for
the free and clear conveyance of water.
The foregoing contractual provisions are clear on their
face and clearly indicate the intent of the parties that there
would be no water conveyed but rather there would be an agreement
whereby the Defendants could purchase water at Formen
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Corporation's cost.

That should have been

the finding of the lower Court and
in fact the court has no power to remake the contracts for the
benefit of the party.

See 17 Am. Jr. Contracts, Section 242,

pages 627 & 628 quoted as follows:
Power of the court to make or change contract for
parties.
It is a fundamental principle that a court may not make
a new contract for the parties or rewrite their contract
under the guise or construction. In other words, the
interpretation or construction of a contract does not
include its modification or the creation of a new or
different one. It must be construed and enforced
according terms employed, and the court has no right to
interpret the agreement as meaning something different
from what the parties intended as expressed by the
language they saw fit to employ. A court is not at
liberty to revise, modify or distort any agreement while
professing to construe it, and has no right to make a
different contract than that actually entered into by
the parties. Courts cannot make for the parties better
or more equitable agreements then they themselves have
been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because
they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the
parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and
to the detriment of the other, or, by construction,
relieve one of the parties from terras which he
voluntarily consented to or impose on him those which he
did not.
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE CROSSCLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS
BRYCE AVERILL, HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA
HUFFAKER, THOMAS GENE REID AND MARY REID
AGAINST FORMEN CORPORATION, FOR A REFUND
OF MONIES PAID TO FORMEN CORPORATION,
WHERE SUCH CLAIMS WERE IN VIOLATION OF
THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, IN IMPROPER
JURISDICTION FOR THIS COURT TO RULE, AND
WHERE THERE EXISTS GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT.
Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party is entitled to Summary Judgment if, among other things,
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there is no issue of material fact.

This rule was confirmed by

the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Frederick May & Company v.
Dunn, 368 P.2d 266 (Utah 1962).

In this case the Court stated:

To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence,
admissions and inferences therefrom, viewed most
favorably to the loser, must show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, and that the winner is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Such showing
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable
possibility that the loser could win if given a trial.
The basis of Foreclosure Defendants1 Fourth Cause of
Action for Summary Judgment was a simple two (2) sentence
assumption that Plaintiffs were (1) in violation of federal
interstate land sale laws and (2) that Defendants1 were
therefore entitled to a refund of all monies paid to Formen
Corporation.
As in exhibit to Defendants memorandum of points and
authorities in support of motion for summary judgment on crossclaim of foreclosure Defendants, Defendants included a copy of
the Interstate Land Sales Act.

Section 1420 of the Interstate

Land Sales Disclosure Act provides that the State Court shall
have jurisdiction.

There is a question of fact therefore as to

whether the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for Sanpete
County, had the authority to rule upon this motion for summary
judgment.
The Defendants memorandum points out the fact that the
Formen Corporation agreed to allow purchasers who purchased
prior to April 9, 1982, to rescind their contracts if request
to do so was made within two years after the date of purchase.
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Defendants Reids and Averill complied with this
agreement, requesting contract revision in accordance with the
two year provision.

Defendants Huffakers did not comply with

this agreement as acknowledged in Defendants memorandum.

This

clearly present a genuine issue of fact upon which the Court
should rule, denying summary judgment to Cross-Claim
Defendants Harry Huffaker and Elza Huffaker.
Upon full examination of Defendants points and the
Interstate Land Sales Act, it is now Plaintiffs1 position to
hereby stipulate to an obligation to reimburse Defendants
Thomas .Gene Reid, Mary Reid, and Bryce Averill, and accordingly,
Plaintiffs hereby authorize payment to Defendants Reids and
Averill by and through a release of funds that are in escrow.
Defendants memorandum raised an additional issue of
fact in reference to Utah Code Annotated 57-11-17 (as inacted
1973) which provides that a purchaser is entitled to rescission
and refund of all monies paid where the developer has made an
untrue statement.

There is clearly an issue of fact as to

whether developers made an untrue statement.

This issue should

have been tried and not ruled on in a motion for summary
judgment as to Defendants Huffakers.
There is a question of fact as to the Courts decision
allowing rescission under the state act which had a longer
statute of limitation than the federal act, but under that act
there had to be the finding of an untrue statement.

Under the

federal act if the Defendants were not delivered a copy of the
statement within two years they would have the right to
rescission.

The disputed facts as to jurisdiction, the statute of
limitations, the rescission agreement, and the validity of
Plaintiffs1 statement are issues to be tried rather than ruled
upon in a motion for summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE AGAINST
MEL PARKS, AND IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS1 SIXTH
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS WHERE
THE LOWER COURT BARRED THE PLAINTIFFS FROM
OBTAINING PERTINENT INFORMATION AND DEVELOPING
THE CASE IN PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY BY EVIDENTIARY
RULINGS AT THE TIME OF DEPOSITION BEFORE THE
COURT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VOLUMINOUS EVIDENCE
WHICH WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS.
Defamation when combined with a joint effort to
effectuate an anti-competitive effort constitutes a violation of
Utah State Antitrust Laws.
The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants have violated
the Utah Antitrust Laws by restraining trade under Utah Code
Annotated 76-10-914, quoted as follows:
Illegal anticompetitive activities. (1) Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce is declared to be illegal.
The foregoing is a criminal statute, but the "Utah
Antitrust Act" also provides for a civil remedy under the
foregoing section.

That remedy is provided to Plaintiffs under

Utah Code Annotated 76-10-919(1) as follows:
Persons and governmental entities may bring action for
injunctive relief or damages - Treble damages - costs.
(1) A person, including the state or any of its
political subdivisions or agencies, who is injured or is
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threatened with injury in his business or property by a
violation of this act, may bring an action for
appropriate injunctive relief and damages and the Court
shall, subject to the provision of subsection(3), in
addition to granting any appropriate temporary,
preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, award three
times the amount of damages sustained, plus the costs of
suit and a reasonable attorney's fee.
Federal cases under the Federal Antitrust laws should
be used in interpreting Utah Antitrust laws, Utah Code
Annotated, 76-10-926, quoted as follows:
Interpretation of act. The legislature intends that
the Courts, in construing this Act, will be guided by
interpretation given by the Federal Courts to
comparable Federal Antitrust Statutes and by other state
Courts to comparable state antitrust statutes.
The comparable federal statutes to Utah Code Annotated
76-10-914 and 76-10-919 (1) are Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 USC Section 15)
provides as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nation, is duly declared to be illegal . . .
Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 USC Section 14) is as
follows:
(a) except as provided in subsection (b), any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the Antitrust Laws may
sue therefore in any District Court of the United
States in the district in which the Defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonble attorneys fees . . .
Therefore, under the foregoing Statute, Section 1 of
the Sherman Act and Section 4 of the Clayton Act, a federal
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remedy is provided which is the same as the Utah Code Provisions
providing for remedies to companies and individuals under 76-10914 and 76-10-919 (1).
Cases interpreting these federal sections are therefore
governing under the Utah Act by virtue of Utah Code Annotated 7610-962.

Numerous federal cases have interpreted whether or not

slanderous statements can constitute antitrust violations when
aimed by one competitor at another.

The prevailing view is that

this type of conduct does violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act
and it would therefore violate the comparable Utah provisions.
One such case is Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc, vs. National
Assocation of Independent Sewing Machine Dealers, et al,, a 9th
circuit case decided in 1958, 260 F,2d 803, 1958 Trade cases,
paragraph 69, 180 which was decided by the 10th Circuit on Appeal
from the United States District Court for the District of Utah.
The Plaintiff sewing machine dealer who was new to the area sued
the Trade Association for printing an article in its magazine
claiming:

(1)

that the article was defamatory; and (2) that the

article as published was an antitrust violation in that it was an
attempt to restrain trade. The lower court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants and the Plaintiffs appealed.
The 10th Circuit before Chief Judge Bratton and Judges Phillips
and Lewis reversed, stating that the Complaint did set forth a
cause of action and that the article on its face presented a
prima facia slander, and introduced sufficient facts to prevent
summary judgment being granted on the antitrust claim.
article is quoted as follows:
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The

'You will probably receive a lot of complaints after
we open up business here 1 , T. C. Kaplan executive vice
president, Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc., told Hendrich
Romeyn, Business Men's Alliance (Better Business Bureau)
in his Salt Lake City office yesterday.
Mr. Kaplan called at his office, Mr. Romeyn said to
try to impress him with the bigness and strength of
Atlas.
'He showed me a printed prospectus on the financial
standing of this corporation he represents. I am a man
of considerable experience in stocks and bonds, and I
read the report frora beginning to end several times, but
I'll be darned if I could find who owned what, ind what
who owned if they owned it. Many prominent names are
used, which naturally impressed me, but their actual
connection is left very vague', Mr. Romeyn said.
'As to Mr. Kaplan's warning that my office will
likely receive many calls frora his customers, this of
course only made me wonder why. If a man calls the
police department and says he is g'oing to shoot his
wife, this does not make the crime any less serious
when it happens.
'Regardless of all those fancy names and nine-digited
figures in his prospectus, this office will treat
complaints against them on their own merits.
'At this point we have no information, except his own,
that we may expect trouble, and until we do, we will
assume that Atlas will, if it opens up here as he says,
operate under the rules of free enterprise and under
good business judgment', Mr. Romeyn concluded.
The general supporting allegations in this case are
identical to those asserted by the Plaintiff Formen Corporation.
The Court states at page 805:
The Association Davies and the other named Defendants'
through collaboration, cooperation and conspiracy have
entered into a plan or scheme to unreasonably restrict
and restrain the business of pursuing and selling sewing
machines in interstate commerce by a program of
publishing faults and defamatory information about
'Atlas and its "products" to induce Atlas' suppliers and
customers not to deal with it for the unlawful purpose
of eliminating Atlas' competition in the purchase and
sale of sewing machines in interstate commerce.
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The Court found that this allegation properly set forth
a cause of action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to the same
effect as United States vs, Central Code Apron and Linen
Service, 1952, 1953 Trade Cases, paragraphs 67, 394, Forgett vs.
Shaff, 1950, 1951 Trade Cases, paragraph 62, 610, Forgett vs.
Shaff, 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, 1950-1951 Trade Cases,
paragraph 62,000, 610, 181 F.2d 754.
The Defendants1 repeated attempts to influence
governmental agencies and bodies against the Plaintiffs and to
induce action against them constitute violations of the Utah
Antitrust Laws.
The Defendants have made a concerted effort to
engender complaints to various governmental agencies and have
succeeded in those efforts in that complaints have been made to
the following governmental agencies by the Defendants and by
other parties motivated by the Defendants:
1.

The Sanpete County Commission.

2.

The Sanpete County Attorney's Office.

3.

The Utah State Natural Resource Department, Water
Resource Divisions and Water Rights Division.

4.

The Federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development.

5.

The Utah State Sanitation Department.

6.

The Utah Business Regulations Department.

Those contacts are supported by the fact statements
heretofore set forth in this appellant brief.
Fred Smith has explained in his Affidavit the
tremendous harrassment that has occurred on the part of the
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Defendants and has confirmed the fact that he has spent over
$20,000.00 in legal expenses in meeting those objections.
The leading case in this area is California Transport
vs. Trucking Unlimited, (U.S. Supreme Court, 1972) 92 S.Ct. 609,
404 U.S. 508.
The summary of this case by the Court at page 642
provides as follows:
The Complaint in a civil suit, instituted undar
Section 4 of the Clayton Act in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California,
alleged that the Defendant highway carrier had conspired
to put the planitiff highway carrier out of business as
competitors by instituting action in state and federal
proceedings to resist and defeat the plaintiff's
applications concerning operating rights, and that the
defendants had combined to deter the plaintiff1s from
having ffree and unlimited access1 to the agencies and
courts and to defeat such right by massive concerted and
purposeful activities of the Complaint for failure to
state a cause of action (1967 Trade Cases, Section
72,298), but the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed. (432 F.2d 755)*
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded the case for
trial. In an opinion by Douglas, J., expressing the
view of five members of the Court, it was held that:
(1) although highway carriers, as part of the right of
petition protected by the First Amendment, had the right
to access to agencies and courts to be heard on
applications sought by competitive highway carriers,
nevertheless they were not necessarily thereby given
immunity from the antitrust laws and (2) a violation of
the antitrust laws would be established in the case at
bar if the plaintiffs' allegations were proved as facts,
particularly the allegations that the defendants,
through massive, concerted, and purposeful group
activites, had combined to deter the plaintiffs from
having "free and unlimited access" to the agencies and
courts, it being material whether the means used by the
defendants might have been unlawful.
Defendants claim that they had the unrestricted right to
en mass contact all the governmental agencies which are
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heretofore enumerated.

In Trucking Unlimited, Justice Douglas

refutes such a notion in the following language at page 647:
Petitioners rely on our statment in Pennington that
'nor shields from the Sherman Act a conserted effort to
influence public officials regardless of intent or
purpose. 381 U.S., at 670, 14 L Ed. 2d at 636.
In the present case however, the allegations are not
that the conspirators sought fto influence public
officials1 but that they sought to bar their
competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory
tribunals and so to usurp the decision making process.
It is alleged that petitioners 'instituted the
proceedings with actions . . . with or without probable
cause, and regardless of the merits of the case1. The
nature of the views pressed does not of course,
determine whether First Amendment rights may be
invoked; but they may bear upon a purpose to deprive the
competitors of meaningful access of the agencies and
courts.
The actions of the Defendants in this case in bombarding
governmental agencies and trying to influence them to withdraw
approval from the subdivision, particularly efforts to cause Utah
County, HUD and the Utah Department of Business Regulations to do
so, are precisely those kinds of actions which in Trucking
Unlimited were found to be violative of the Utah Antitrust laws
as heretofore set forth.
Mr. Howard argues on behalf of the Defendants that
they had a constitutional privilege to so approach the
governmental agencies and that all such communication was in fact
privileged and any construction of contrary laws would render
them unconstitutional.

Those precise arguments were made by

Counsel in the Trucking Unlimited case and were promptly rejected
by the Court at page 648 stating:
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It is well settled that First Amendments rights are
not immunized from regulation when they are used as an
intrical part of conduct which violates a valid
Statute. Giboney vs. Empire Storage Company, 336 U.S.
490 93 L Ed., 834, 69 Sup. Ct. 684. In that case
Missouri enacted a Statute banning secondary boycotts
and we sustained an injunction against picketing to
enforce a boycott saying:
It is true that the agreements and course of conduct
here were as in most instances brought about through
speaking or writing but it has never been deemed an
inbridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because tVe conduct was
in part inititated, evidence, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed . . .
Such an expansive interpretation of the Constitutional
guarantees of speech and press would make it partically
impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in
restraintive trade as well as many other agreements and
conspiracies deemed injurious to society. (336 U.S., at
502, 93 L Ed. at 843.)*
In Associated Press vs. United States, 326 U.S. 1 , 89 L
ed.7TffT3", 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, we held that the Associated
Press was not immune from the antitrust laws by reason
of the fact that the press is under the shelter of the
First Amendment.
In this case the Defendants in their ongoing attempt to
be over precise may argue that there is a distinction between
preventing access to a governmental agency and an attempt to
initiate action through those agencies.

That the holding of

Trucking Unlimited is broader than merely those situations in
which the Defendant interferes with application is made clear on
page 648 in the following language of Justice Douglas:
There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible
practice which may corrupt the administrative or
judicial process and which may result in antitrust
violations misrepresentations, condoned in the political
arena are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory
process. Apponents before agencies or courts often
think poorly of the others tactics, motions or defenses
and may readily call them baseless. One claim which a
court or agency may think baseless may go unnoticed
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that a pattern of baseless, repetitive claim may emerge
which leads the fact finder to conclude that the
administrative and judicial processes have been abused.
That may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But
once it is drawn, the case is established that abuse of
these processes produced an illegal result, effectively
barring respondents from access to the agencies and
courts. Insofar as the adminstrative or judicial
processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot
acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of
'political expression.'"
Trucking Unlimited has spanned a large progeny of cases
which clearly enforces the notion that a concerted effort by a
group of individuals to impose upon a competitor through an abuse
of administrative and/or judicial processes is inappropriate and
violative of the antitrust laws.
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
WHICH WHERE PREJUDICIAL WHERE NUMEROUS
OBJECTIONS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL WERE SUSTAINED
AND LIKE OBJECTIONS BY PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL
WERE OVERRULED; WHERE RELEVANT TESTIMONY IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS WAS NOT ALLOWED
TO BE HEARD; WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS ALLOWED
TO TESTIFY AS AN ADVOCATE FOR THE DEFENSE
POSTURE CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CANON
OF ETHICS; AND WHERE THE VERY NATURE AND NUMBER
OF THESE RULINGS AND COMMENTARY OF THE COURT
FAVORED THE DEFENSE, DEMONSTRATING BIAS AND
PREJUDICIAL COURT RULINGS.
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that the
judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b)
create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the
issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully
surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to
anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
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In the instant case the judge repeatedly excluded
evidence from testimony but not apparently due to any of the
three (3) reasons listed above.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43 Evidence (c),
provides that if an objection to a question propounded to a
witness is sustained by the Court, an examining attorney may make
a special offer of what he expects to prove by the answer of the
witness.

The Court upon request shall take and report the

evidence in full, unless it clearly appears the evidence is not
admissible on any grounds or that the witness is privileged.
In the instant case testimony of the Sanpete County
attorney was not allowed in Court, notwithstanding the proffer of
testimony by Plaintiffs1 counsel, indicating the relevancy and
importance of such testimony.

Even though it is clear that such

testimony would contradict the Defense posture, such testimony
should have, on the grounds called for by Plaintiffs' counsel,
been allowed in the trial hearing.
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide in section (b) for
the scope of cross-examination such that defense counsel could
subsequently interrogate-him by leading questions without being
bound by his testimony and make contradictions and impeach him in
all respects, and the witness, thus called may be contradicted
and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party.

Wherefore,

cross-examination upon the subject matter of his examination in
chief should be adequate descents to any facts or and truth
obtained through Plaintiffs questioning and subsequent testimony
for the record.

It is essential that revelant testimony be
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allowed in a Court of law for the purpose of defining and
illustrating Plaintiffs1 case.
In the instant case the testimony of Ross Blackham was
not allowed.

Plaintiffs considered Mr. Blackham to be an expert

witness in this case with testimony relevant and vital to
Plaintiffs1 case.
THE COURT: His opinion has not legal weight at all. It
has no legal weight in this court and it has no legal
weight -- and it has no more weight than any attorney
that goes down there or any individual that goes down
there. (Tr. Vol. II, Page 472,lines 7 through 11).
Whether or not Mr. Blackham was an expert, his testimony
in the form of an opinion should have been admissible under Rule
56:
(1) If the witness is not testifying as an expert his
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is
limited to such opinions or inferences as the judge
finds (a) may be rationally based on the perception of
the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear understanding
of his testimony or to the determination of the fact in
issue.
Clearly Plaintiffs1 sought testimony from Mr. Blackham
in order to determine important facts in issue.

Mr. Summerhays

explained the relvlancy of proffered testimony as follows:
MR. SUMMERHAYS: They're claiming or we 1 re claiming that
they called us crooks, cheats, and liars and that the
subdivision was illegally registered . . . (Tr. Vol II,
Page 469, lines 16 through 18).
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Now, I think, now, I think truth is a
defense that they're trying to raise and we're trying to
share the elements of our disparagment. One is that
they said were illegally registered. That was not
because we were properly registered and it was improper
to accuse us of that which would have been a criminal
violation of the local statute and so I'm just trying to
get out whether we were properly registered. That's all
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I'm trying to find out. (Tr. Vol. II., page 469, lines
24 though Page 470, line 7)
In spite of the fact that the Defense counsel continued
to argue the inadmissibility of the testimony and Plaintiffs1
counsel offered further explanations as to the revelancy of said
testimony, the Court ultimately found that the admission of this
testimony was not relevant to Plaintiffs1 case and that the basic
foundation for questioning was wrong in that, it is not a
criminal offense being discussed.

Mr. Summerhays explained how a

criminal offense was worthy of consideration as follows:
MR. SUMMERHAYS: They accuse ray client of a criminal
offense, they say you committed something that is a
criminal crime and then they defame him unless they are
true, unless it's a true statement, so I'm trying to
find our whether that was a true statement or not, Your
Honor, and this man is the best man to tell us. Tr.
Vol. II, Page 474, lines .17 through 22.
MR. HOWARD: Objection, irrevelant and immaterial, why
they did or didn't. Tr. Vol. II, Page 479, lines 4
through 6.
THE COURT:

Objection's sustained.

Whereupon the witness was excused and Mr. Blackham, who
was qualified to given an opinion as to the violation of the
ordinance, was not allowed to testify.

That testimony was

important to show that Formen Corporation had not violated the
statute in connection with that subdivision.

Conversely, the

testimony of Mr. Don Skipworth, in response to Defense
questioning airaed at showing said violation was allowed; where at
Mr. Skipworth, a Formen Corporation officer was not qualified as
was Mr. Blackham,to testify upon the issued involved.

The

Plaintiffs consequently were not allowed fair representation and
good faith questioning to define and exemplify their position.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing presentation of facts and law
Plaintiffs appeal now to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
for a reversal of the lower Court's Judgment awarding Attorneys
Fees to Defendants*

Plaintiffs have spent an abundance of time,

effort, and money in the belief that they were entitled to relief
as sought in their pleadings.

The proceedings were instituted In

this matter with good faith, and with the belief that Plaintiffs
were damaged by the wrongdoings of the Defendants.

Plaintiffs

pursued their claims with diligence and determination in an
earnest endeavor to recover from loss and to achieve protection
of the law from any damaging actions that may occur in the
future.
The Defendants have not proven their allegation that the
action was brought in "bad faith11.

Upon the preponderance of

evidence presented for review it is obvious that Plaintiffs1
claim is supported such that the Defendants have not proven the
case was "without merit".

The Defendants have failed to prove

that the claims of the Plaintiffs were "of little weight or
importance having no basis in law or fact".

In fact, the claims

as presented by the Plaintiffs and demonstrated within this
appellant brief are based on facts presented at the trial by
numerous witnesses.

The Defendants failed to prove that

Plaintiffs were wrong in initiating and pursuing this litigation.
Plaintiffs conscientiously sought relief within the provisions of
the law and in the interest of justice.
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The State of Utah recognizes the common-law cause of
action of Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic
Relations.

A prima facia cause of action is made out for that

tort by showing that the Defendants intentionally interfered with
the Plaintiffs1 exisiting or prospective economic relations, that
the Defendants were motivated by an improper purpose or used
improper means, and that the Plaintiffs suffered an injury as a
result of the Defendants1 acts.

In the present case, there are

more than sufficient facts for a trier of fact to conclude that
each of these requirements has been met.

Therefore, Defendants1

Motion to Dismiss this case for the First Cause of Action Tortious Interference was inappropriate and should not have been
granted.
Utah recognizes the doctrine of slander per se in cases
such as this one where the Plaintiffs are charged with criminal
misconduct or conduct not consistent with the operation of a
lawful business.

The Plaintiffs need not show that the

Defendants intended to defame them in order to recover.

Because

there is evidence on which a trier of fact could base a finding
of malice on the part of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs may be
entitled to general and punitive damages as well as proved
special damages.
The Defendants claim of right to slander the Plaintiffs
where the recipient of the defamatory matter is a government
agency or official is not supported by authority.
Defense Attorney Jackson Howard said in his opening
remarks that:
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• . .Mr. Smith is a peculiar man and we think that
evidence will demonstrate to show you he's combination
meglamaniac, paranoid, schizophrenic. He does these
kinds of things. He gets very, very sensitive. He
develops an imaginary peak from what he thinks are
perceived wrongs that others commit and, therefore, he
gets very, very offended . . .
(Tr. Vol. I, page 42, lines 9 through 16)
However, the Defense presentation did not elaborate upon
or prove the allegations of the above statement, and was in and
of itself slanderous in nature.
The doctrine of conditional privilege does not apply in
this case because the Defendants have no legitimate interest
which publication of defamatory matter to others would correctly
or reasonably help them defend

or maintain.

Even if a

conditional privilege could be found, it would have been violated
by the Defendants failure to act in good faLth and without
malice.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs have ample grounds on which to
make a claim for slander and the Defendants" Motion to Dismiss
this case for the Second through Fourth Causes of Action was
inappropriate and should not have been granted.
Plaintiffs hereby appeal to the Utah Supreme Court for a
reversal of the lower Court's award for reformation such that
Defendants would be provided water notwithstanding the terms of
the agreements previously set forth by both parties to this
action.

Defendants have not provided documentation in support of

their claims for water rights. The contractual provisions are
clear in the signed agreements which were drawn to set forth
terms and arrangements whereby water would be available for all
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parties concerned at any given time by means of the execution of
the contractual agreements.

Plaintiffs are previously obligated

for the payment of said water rights.

The facts and law set

forth in this appellant brief clearly demonstrate Plaintiffs'
position in this regard. The intent of the parties of both parts
was that water would be conveyed upon purchase of the same from
Plaintiffs by the Defendants.

Absent a showing of intent to the

contrary, the Defendants should not have been granted reformation
for free and clear conveyance of water.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs

seek a reversal of this decision of the lower Court.
Jurisdiction of the lower Court is questioned in appeal
to the Supreme Court for a decision as to the lower Court's
authority to rule upon a motion brought on the merits of an
agreement with the Federal Office of Interstate Land Sales.
Concurrently there is a matter of fact as to whether Defendants1
crossclaims were intitiated in violation of the Statute of
Limitations.
Certainly the questions concerning the rescission
agreement entered into by Formen Corporation and the authenticity
of Formen1s offering statement are questions of fact and of law
which should have been heard at trial rather than ruled on in a
pre-trial motion for summary judgment.
The Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the lower Court's
decision to dismiss the cause of action for Antitrust Violations
on the basis of facts and law rendered within this appellant
brief.

Although Plaintiffs were prevented from conducting

thorough discovery on the subject due to Court rulings, there is
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sufficient evidence and appropriate law to warrant a review of
this issue.

The actions of the Defendant did, in fact, restrain

the trade of the Plaintiff; and the actions of the Defendants
constituted a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade and commerce of the Plaintiffs, which is

in violation

of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-914, and which entitled Plaintiffs
to bring action under 76-10-919 of the Utah Code Annotated for
damages resulting from the illegal and wrongful actions of the
Defendants as heretofore set forth.
It is a fundamental doctrine of the law that a party to
be affected by a personal judgment must have a day in Court or
opportunity to be heard (46 Am Jur 2d §18). There was a
substantial amount of evidence as proffered by Plaintiffs1
counsel to the Court and as indicated in the substance of the
expected evidence by questions indicating the desired answers,
which lines of questioning were repeatedly objected to by Defense
Counsel and sustained by the Court, such that Plaintiffs were
unable to enter supportive and factual testimony to the record
which would verify and substantiate Plaintiffs1 claims.

The

Plaintiffs1 opinion is that the erroneous exclusion of evidence
in both pretrail discovery and in Court during the trial resulted
in the exclusion of evidence which would have had significant
influence in bringing about a different finding.
Respectfully submitted.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Leslie W. Slaugh
and Jackson Howard, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, 120 East 300
North, Provo, Utah

84603 this 20th day of June 1985.

ADDENDUM

Plaintiffs1 Exhibit #35 "More Fireworks" Letter and
"Fireworks" Letters
Order Awarding Reformation and Attorney Fees
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judgment
Joint Venture Agreement
Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution Agreement
Summary Judgment on Counterclaim on Foreclosure Defendants

Exhibit "A" to plaintiffs answers- to interrogatories
HI Folks,
Tucked away in our fantastic winter wonderland, the snow, like a blanket, has
made Hideaway Valley, the perfect Christmas card picture*
Ue have 13 families taking up permanent residence*
School opened the whole last week of August*

Giving us about 19 kids*

Hideaway Valley has about 6 kids

going to Falrview grade school* 7 going to Moroni Middle school, end 6 more attending
Mt* Pleasant High School*

Combined with Indianola, the bus picks up about 56 kids,

making an all time high for this area*
U/sfve had two weddings and one new baby since summer*

Tom Parks married Robin

Dove from San Diego, and Itfendy Huffaker married Bruce Catmull from Salt Lake City*
New baby Matthew belongs to Hal and Shauna Parks*
Some of the kids from HV spent 3 days this summer on a campout at Doe's Valley
with the Falrview 3rd Ward*

All had a good time*

volleyball, and all the food were provided*
3rd place in the competition games*
they all got it*

Movies waterskiing, fun games,

Awards were given out for 1st, 2nd, &

Sunburn was not choosey about who won or lo9t,

Mel Pdrks received the Champion Pancake flipper award, and Myrt

Parks received thB Chief Cook and Bottle Washer award.
A few of the ladies of Hidsaway and Indianola area, get together once a month
to share various Ideas on crafts to make for gifts and home*
creations have come out of these sessions*

An abundance of darling

We only wish more women were here to join

in the fun*
A few families joined .the Falrview 3rd Ward at their Christmas Formal*
recognize some,

Didnft

Boy how we change when we're 8ll dressed up*

We'd like to acknowledge a special thanks to Don Charlesworth, for making It
possible" for everyone to get in and out when it snows*

Even thof he gets his tractor

stuck, we appreciate the wear and tear on him and the tractor*

We even appreciate

the noise at 4 in the morning*
Ue also occasionally see Max Smith On the ever popular gradar clearing the main
road*

Our thanks to him as well*

Altho the roads ere snowpacked and slick at times, we do try to keep in touch
with the other families**

£\fen if it's just to wave while picking up kids from

the bus*
Christmas vacation started Dec 24th, kids are happy, mothers are looking for a
cheap motel in another town, iJhere we can get some peace and quiet*

School starts

again Dan. 3rd* HOORAY!
Not much else has happened out here, s^nce winter hit*
to Summer when we'll see a lot of you backagaln*

But we're looking forward

Keep in touch*

Oear Association Member,
I FIREWORKS I As you have probably surmised after reading the "P.S." addition to
the Pat Mounteer newsletter, there is not only a lack of concensus among our trustees,
but feelings have deteriorated to the point that some trustees no lonoer wish to serve
on the same Board with each other!
Your Association President end Vice-President feel they haven't accomplished a
thing while serving with the present Board - that their many trips and meetings have
beon a complete waste of time and money*

But we, as year-round residents of Hideaway

Valley, have been watching closely the activities of the Board and feel these two
trustees deserve our thanks and support for seeking after the best welfare of the
Association and striving to keep Association funds from being spent foolishly* We
intend to let all the Associetlon members know what has been going on in our next
Association meeting.

(Uait ftll you see the meeting agenda!)

Property Owners should be interested to know that when your President and VicePresident called for the Annual meeting to elect new trustees as called for in the
Association By-Laws, the other 3 trustees protested the motion!
Never-tho-less, please be advised that our Annual meeting as called for in the ByLaws (Section 2.1) will bo held on Danuary 27th, 1983 at 7:00 P.M. in the East Cafeteria of the Provo High School, 1125 N. University In Provo, Utah, for the express
purpose of electing new trustees and informing Association members of important
matters concerning Hideaway Valley. Ue earnestly urge all members to be in attendance
to vote your preference of how you want your money to be spent and your ideas.concerning amendments to the By-Laws. It is very important that you attend this meeting.
PLEASE COME!
NOTE OF INTEREST:

Much time, effort, and money has been spent by individual

members at no cost to tho Association - (everything from the postage costs of this
newsletter to thB services of en attorney concerning your rights as property owners.
Sincerely,
MR. & MRS. DEL TAYLOR

MR. * MRS. EVERETT BRITTON

MR. & MRS. FRANK PINO

»

GENE REIO

»

LARRY ANDERSON

*

BRYCE AVERILL

••

HAL PARKS

•

3ERRY PARKS

«

KEITH HUFfAKER

"

TOM PARKS

STARLA PETERSON

P.5. Trustoas Mel Parks 4 Don Charlesworth, want you all to know that they believe the
the Sojrd waa in error in voting to take away the voting right of members with unpaid
assessments. They believe, as we do, that that is a matter that requires approval of
tho Association members ourselves.
WHETHER YOU HAVE PAID YOUR ASSESSBENT OR NOT —
NEXT ASSOCIATION MEETING THIS DANUARYI

YOU WILL HAVE VOTING RIGHTS IN THE

Exhibit "B" to Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories

*

RORE FIREWORKS

*

!C£ THIS ORIGINAL LETTER WAS WRITTEN, THERE HAS BEEN MORE UNDERMINING OF YOUR RIGHTS AS
IPERTY OWNERS.

THIS NOTE I S TO INFORM YOU, THAT REGARDLESS OF ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY

IEVE TO THE CONTRARY, (TRUSTEES, FREO SMITH, PAT MOUNTEER, & LAMAR MACKLIN,' MAY TRY TO
ICK THIS MEETING),

THERE WILL BE AN ASSOCIATIOfJ MEETING H & D THIS DANURRY 2 7TH AS CALLED

t I N THE ASSOCIATION BY-LAWS FOR THE. EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ELECTING NEW TRUSTEES AND
'IMG YCU EXTREMELY IMPORTANT INFORMATION OF THE ASSOCIATION.
I MAY HAVE RECIEVEO A LETTER FROM PAT MOUNTEER, STATING THAT MEL PARKS HAS BEEN RELEASED,
FEEL YOU SHS'JLD K.\'OW THE TRUTH OF THAT MATEER AND HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERHINE HOW THE
.OCIATIOrJ I S T 0 ' 9 E RUN AND HOW YOUR MONEY I S TO BE SPENT.
.ASE DON«T LET US DOWN — CO'lE TO THIS MEETING AND EXERCISE YOUR VOTE AFTER HEARING ALL

TACTS.

<£JU. dUt&UoCft^
DON CHARLE3W0RTH,

VICE-PRESIDENT

$£

(faJjl^*

DEL TAYLo/,

MEMBER

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FORMEN CORPORATION, Et al,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

-vs-

CIVIL NO. 8579

MEL PARKS, Et al,
4

Defendants.
The following matters having been taken under advisement,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
WATER ISSUE
The Court finds it was the purpose of the Dissolution Agreement
to effect an equal division of the Joint Venture Assets. The water as well
as the land was an asset and the land could not be legally conveyed to a
purchaser without water.
IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT that Parks Enterprises, Inc.,
is entitled to a Decree of Reformation and that Formen Corporation shall
provide water without cost to Parks Enterprises, Inc., for the lots conveyed
to it under the Dissolution Agreement.

The water to be provided in the

same proportion as furnished with other lots heretofore sold.
ATTORNEY FEES ISSUE
This Court finds the Plaintiffs case was without merit and
lacking in good faith.
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs intended by the law suit
to take advantage of the Defendants and to hinder and delay the Defendants

-2in their investigation of their rights under the law.
The Court finds that the use of legal process in this claim
for millions of dollars and excessive discovery was done to prevent the
Defendants in their use of property purchased and in the legal process.
The Court finds that the legal process was used for the purpose
of frightening the Defendants.

Bad faith was exhibited in the filing of

the Complaint and the causes of action used and in the method of prosecution.
The Court finds the Plaintiff abused the Court processes,
namely the Restraining Order, Injunction and excessive Discovery.
The Court finds the Defendants, at most, undertook to make
reasonable inquiries concerning their rights as property owners in Joint
Venture and as subdivision owners. The Plaintiff broughtand maintained this
action in bad faith to prevent Defendants inquiry and use of the Courts.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE AWARDED JUDGMENT against the Plaintiffs
for Attorney fees and costs, which the Court finds reasonable, as follows:
Attorney Fees
Office Costs
Court Costs

TOTAL COSTS

$30,000.00
- 3,771.05
1,800.75
$35,571.80

The Defendants shall prepare Findings, Conclusions of Law and
Decree in conformity with this Order.
Dated this ^ Q

day of October, 1984.

Re:

Formen Corporation -vs- Mel Parks, Et al—Case No. 8579

3

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
Mailed a copy of the above and foregoing Order to the following,
postage prepaid, thiSo^^day of October, 1984, from offices at Manti, Utah:
Jackson Howard, Attorney at Law, Offices at 120 East 300 North
Delphi Building, Provo, Utah, 84603
Lowell V. Summerhays, Attorney at Law, Offices at 420
Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101

Carole B. Mel lor
Trial Court Executive

1

H O W A R D L E W I S ft P E T E R S E N
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120

2

EAST 3 0 0

N J B T K STREET

P O Box T78
PROVO UTAH 8 4 6 0 3
TELEPHONE 373 6345

3
4
5

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY

6

STATE OF UTAH

7
FORMEN CORPORATION, a U t a h
DON SKIPWORTH,
a n d FRED SMITH,

8 corporation,
9

Plaintiffs,

10

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VS.

11
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISES,
12 INC., an Idaho corporation,
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a
13 partnership, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY
TAYLOR, his wife, LARRY
14 ANDERSON, HAL PARKS, JERRY
PARKS, STARLA PETERSON aka
STARLA
PARKS, BRYCE AVERILL,
15
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA
16 HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS
GENE REID, MARY REID, his
17 wife, WANDA HOPPER, PARKS &
SONS SANITATION, INC., a Utah
18 corporation, PARKS & SONS
INTERMOUNTAIN, INC., an Idaho
19 corporation, and JOHN DOES I
through X,
20
Defendants.
21
22

CIVIL NO. 8579

The plaintiffs' complaint and the defendants' counterclaims

23 came on for trial before the above-entitled Court on August 27
24 through 30, 1984.

The plaintiffs were present and represented by

1 their attorney, Lowell V. Summerhays. Defendants Mel Parks, Del
2 Taylor, Nancy Taylor, Hal Parks, Starla Peterson (now Starla Mayers)
3 Bryce Averill, Harry Keith Huffaker, Elza Huffaker, Thomas Gene
4 Reid, and Mary Reid

(hereinafter "defendants") were each present

5 at various times during the trial, and the defendants were repre6 sented by their attorneys, Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slauch.
7 The Court having heard the plaintiffs' evidence, and the defendants
8| having moved at the close of plaintiffs' evidence to dismiss the
9 action for failure to establish a prima facie case, and the Court
I e5«

10| having entertained oral arguments and being fully advised in the
11 premises, now hereby makes and enters the following findings of

t- a. > a
tr
Q u>

O

12

fact and conclusions of law.

13
FINDINGS OF FACT
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

1.

The parties have stipulated and agreed that the counter-

claims of the defendants, with the exception of the third cause of
action on behalf of Parks Enterprises, and the claim for attorney's
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, may be dismissed without
prej udice.
2.

By order of this Court, dated March 27, 1984, this Court

granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to
(1) the causes of action against Nasky Joint Venture, (2) the
causes of action against Nancy Taylor, (3) the causes of action
against Jerry Parks, Starla Parks, and Wanda Hopper, and (4) the
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1 cause of action for injunctive relief.
2

3.

The plaintiffs have stipulated that the fifth cause of

3 action, for negligence against Mel Parks, may be dismissed.
4

4.

None of the defendants intentionally interfered with the

5 performance of any existing or potential contracts to which any
6 of the plaintiffs were parties.
7

5.

None of the defendants intentionally interfered with the

8 existing or potential economic relations of any of the plaintiffs.
9

6.

None of the defendants made or uttered any defamatory

10 statements concerning any of the plaintiffs.
11

7.

None of the defendants acted with malice towards any of

12 the plaintiffs.
13

8.

There was no credible or believable evidence that any of

14 the statements made by any of the defendants were false.
15

9.

There was no credible or believable evidence that any of

16 the plaintiffs had suffered any special damages proximately caused
17 by any of the defendants.
18

10.

There was no believable, credible and concrete evidence

19 concerning any general damages.
20

11.

The evidence concerning general damages was too specula-

21 tive to be worthy of consideration.
22

12.

There was no believable or credible evidence of any

23 conspiracy between or among any of the defendants.
24 /////
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l

13.

There was no believable and credible evidence that any of

2 the defendants committed any acts violative of the applicable
3 anti-trust laws.
4

14.

It was the intention of the parties to the "Memorandum

5 of Partnership Dissolution Agreement" (hereinafter "dissolution
6 agreement") to effect an equal division of the joint venture or
7 partnership assets.
8

15.

Formen Corporation had an obligation, as part of its

9 contribution to the joint venture, to provide the water necessary
«i e gS
5 »

10 for the development of the land owned by the joint venture.

§ * 5 « 11

2 c<

h a. >

i

Q.

St

16.

The water as well as the land was an asset of the joint

12 venture.
13

17.

The land could not legally be conveyed to a purchaser

14 without water.
15

18.

The failure of the dissolution agreement to explicitly

16 list water as an asset and to explicitly provide for the division
17 of the water was due to the mutual mistake of the parties.
18

19.

The parties to the dissolution agreement intended that

19 Parks Enterprises, Inc., would receive, as part of its equal share
20 of the joint venture assets and without additional or separate cost I
i
21
to Parks Enterprises, Inc., the water necessary for the lots receive*
i
22
by Parks Enterprises, Inc., under the dissolution agreement, and. '
23 that the water would be provided in the same proportion as had been
i

24

/////
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1 furnished, or had been contracted to be furnished, for other lots
2 heretofore sold.
3

20.

The plaintiffs* case was without merit and was lacking in

4 good faith.
5

21.

The plaintiffs intended by this lawsuit to take advantage

6 of the defendants and to hinder and delay the defendants in
7 their investigation of their rights under the law.
8

22.

The plaintiffs' use of legal process in their claim for

9 millions of dollars and in their excessive discovery efforts was dond
10 to prevent the defendants from enjoying the use of their property anq
11 from their use of the legal process, and constituted harassment.
12

23.

The plaintiffs used the legal process for the purpose

13 of frightening the defendants.

Bad faith was exhibited in the

14 filing of the complaint and the causes of action alleged and in the
15 method of prosecution.
16

24.

The plaintiffs abused the court processes, in obtaining

17 the restraining order and the injunction, and through excessive
18 discovery proceedings, and in presenting frivolous and meaningless,
19 time consuming evidence and testimony.
20

25.

The defendants, at most, undertook to make reasonable

21 inquiries concerning their rights as property owners in the
22

23

joint venture and as subdivision owners.
26.

The plaintiffs brought and maintained this action in bad

24 faith.
-5-

27.

1

The defendants have incurred attorney's fees in excess

2 of $30,000.00, and the sum of $30,000.00 is a reasonable attorney's
3 fee.
4

28.

The defendants have incurred attorney office costs in

5 the amount of $3,771.05, which amount is reasonable.
6

29.

The defendants have incurred pre-trial court costs in

7 this matter in the sum of $1,800.75.
8
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

9
I ec ? •
: C

u

1.

10

None of the plaintiffs established a cause of action

11 against any of the defendants for tortious interference with

=ffi= *
- a > o-

12 existing or prospective economic relations or with existing

D

13 or potential contracts.

i)

0 •"

2. Formen Corporation did not establish a cause of action for

14

15 slander or libel against any of the defendants.
3.

16

Don Skipworth did not establish a cause of action

17 for slander or libel against any of the defendants.
4.

18

Fred Smith did not establish a cause of action for

19 slander or libel against any of the defendants.
5.

20

None of the plaintiffs established a cause of action

21 against Mel Parks for negligence.
6.

22

None of the plaintiffs established a cause of action

23 against any of the defendants for anti-trust violations.
24

/////
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1

7.

Parks Enterprises, Inc., is entitled to a decree

2 reforming the "Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution Agreement"
3 to include the following paragraph:
Formen Corporation shall provide water without
cost to Parks Enterprises, Inc., for the lots
conveyed to Parks Enterprises, Inc., under this
agreement. The water is to be provided in the
same proportion as has been furnished or has
been contracted to be furnished for other lots
heretofore sold.

4
5
6
7
8

8.

In accordance with the terms of the "Memorandum

9 of Partnership Dissolution Agreement" as understood and
JJ

X CD * »

10 intended by the parties, Formen Corporation should be required

z o <

11 to convey 69 .acre-feet of domestic use water right to

H- n > °Ift
0 "•

0

12 Parks Enterprises.
13

9.

The defendants are entitled to judgment against all

14 defendants, jointly and severally, for reasonable attorney's
15 fees in the amount of $30,000.00, attorney office costs in the
16 amount of $3,771.05, and pre-trial costs in the amount of $3,771.05,
17 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983).
18
19

DATED this

day of December, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

20
21

DON V. TIBBS, District Judge

22 /////
23 /////
24 /////
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this //*- day of
December, 1984:
Mr, Lowell B. Summerhays
Attorney for Plaintiffs
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
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P O BOX 778
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5

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY

6

STATE OF UTAH

7
FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
DON SKIPWORTH,
8
and FRED SMITH,
9
Plaintiffs,
10

JUDGMENT

VS.
11
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISES,
12 INC., an Idaho corporation,
NASKY JOINT' VENTURE, a
13 partnership, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY
TAYLOR, his wife, LARRY
14 ANDERSON, HAL PARKS, JERRY
PARKS, STARLA PETERSON aka
15 STARLA PARKS, BRYCE AVERILL,
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA
16 HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS
GENE REID, MARY REID, his
17 wife, WANDA HOPPER, PARKS &
SONS SANITATION, INC., a Utah
18 corporation, PARKS & SONS
INTERMOUNTAIN, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
and JOHN DOES I
19
through X,
20
Defendants.
21
22

CIVIL NO. 8579

The plaintiffs1 complaint and the defendants' counterclaims

23 came on for trial before the above-entitled Court on August 27
24 through 30, 1984.

The plaintiffs were present and represented by

j;:_ " ••

'"'-N'PT

1 their attorney, Lowell V. Summerhays. Defendants Mel Parks, Del
2 Taylor, Nancy Taylor, Hal Parks, Starla Peterson (now Starla Mayers) ,|
3 Bryce Averill, Harry Keith Huffaker, Elza Huffaker, Thomas Gene
4 Reid, and Mary Reid (hereinafter "defendants") were each present at
5 various times during the trial, and the defendants were repre6 sented by their attorneys, Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh. The
7 Court having heard the plaintiffs' evidence, and the defendants
8 having moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action pursuant to Rule
9 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court having
10 entertained arguments, and having previously entered its findings
11 of fact and conclusions of law, now hereby makes and enters the
12 following judgment:
13

1.

The defendants are granted judgment, no cause of action,

14 against the plaintiffs.
15

2.

All restraining orders or injunctions previously entered

16 in this matter against any of the defendants are vacated.
17

3.

The counterclaims of the defendants for malicious prosecuticjir

18 and defamation are dismissed without prejudice.
19

4.

Parks Enterprises, Inc., is awarded judgment on its

20 counterclaim for reformation against Formen Corporation, and the
21 "Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution Agreement" is reformed
22 to include the following paragraph:
23 /////
24 /////
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m
Formen Corporation shall provide water without
cost to Parks Enterprises, Inc., for the lots
conveyed to Parks Enterprises, Inc., under this
agreement. The water is to be provided in the
same proportion as has been furnished or has
been contracted to be furnished for other lots
heretofore sold.

1
2
3
4
5.

5

In accordance with the provisions of the "Memorandum

6 of Partnership Dissolution Agreement" as herein modified, Formen
7 Corporation is ordered to convey 69 acre feet of domestic use
8 water rights to Parks Enterprises, Inc., within thirty days of
9 the date of this judgment.
o%

S

en

^

I <D « *

0 xlfi
Z o <
o

m

6.

10

The defendants are awarded judgment against the plain-

11 tiffs, jointly and severally, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56

^ UJ

S°of 12 (Supp. 1983), for attorney's fees in the amount of $30,000.00,
h

Q.

> a

2 £»

13 attorney office costs in the amount of $3,771.05, pretrial costs in
14 the amount of $1,800.75, and trial costs in the amount of $
15 for a total of $.

.

DAT.B1) this" ''ft . jjay of December, 1984.

16
17
18
19
20
21

I hereby-cej^Jjdf^that

a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the

foregoing

22
was mailed to the f o l l o w i n g , postage p r e p a i d , t h i s
23
24 / / / / /
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day of

December, 1984:
Mr. Lowell V. Summerhays
Attorney for Plaintiff
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

SECRETARY
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JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT made the

/ *J

day of May, 1978, between

FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, having its principal
place of business in the State of Utah, hereinafter "Formen",
and PARKS ENTERPRISES INC., an Idaho corporation, having
its principal office and place of business at 11444 Ustick
Road, Boise, Ada County, State of Idaho, hereinafter "Parks".

RECITALS
1.

It is the desire of the parties to develop a tract

of recreational land situated in Sanpete County, State of
Utah, which is more particularly described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto.
2.

The parties desire to form a joint venture for the

development and sale of the recreational tract, according to
the terms of this Agreement.

For the reasons herein set forth, and in consideration
of the mutual covenants contained herein, the parties agree
as follows:
SECTION I
Scope and Description
The parties hereby create a joint venture for the
subdivision, development and sale of the recreational tract

identified as Exhibit "A".

The venture shall be conducted

name of Elk Ridge Ranches and the principal office located
at Bountiful, Utah.
SECTION II
Contributions
Parks shall expend up to $180,000.00 to acquire the
said tract of land to be developed, which is described on
Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
Formen shall accept full liability and responsibility
for the development of this tract and shall contribute all
funds and expert services needed to develop said tract.
Said funds and expertise to include but not be limited to
developing a master subdivision plan, obtaining all governmental approvals, engineering, surveying, road construction,
development, governmental reporting, promotion, zoning,
inventory control, management of sales and collection of
sales contracts.

Parties agree that time is of the essence of

this agreement and as a result it is necessary for Formen to
proceed immediately in an orderly, workmanlike manner to effect
the development of the project within 2 4 months from the date of
this agreement.
In addition, it is understood that Formen has acquired
the needed water rights required to develop the tract and
sell the same in subdivided parcels.

Parties agree that

said water is essential to the intent of this Agreement.
Title to said water, however, is subject to the completion
of a purchase contract by Formen from the Rennert Investment

Company, Inc., a Utah corporation.

Formen agrees to provide

water rights to the parcels as they are sold on an "as
needed" basis and further agrees to indemnify and hold Parks
harmless from any liabilities resulting from the insufficiency
of providing such water for the tract or any parcel thereof.
In the event that Formen defaults under the terms of this
agreement or in the event this venture shall not be completed
or terminated short of its time, Formen does hereby grant to
Parks the right to assume their position in the purchase
contract with Rennert wherein Parks will acquire the water
rights by completing the payments of the contract, said
payments not to exceed the original purchase price of $75,000.00.
A copy of the purchase contract for water rights between
Formen as purchaser and Rennert as seller is attached hereto
as Exhibit "B".
SECTION III
Conduct of Venture
Parks shall place $180,000.00 with Backman Abstract &
Title Company with instructions to apply the same to the
acquisition of the tract on or before May 3, 1978. Upon
acquisition, Parks shall have the title conveyed to Backman
Abstract & Title Company, as Trustee, and Backman Abstract
& Title Company shall retain title and convey title to each
lot as it is sold.

Conveyance of the title to Backman

Abstract & Title Company, as Trustee, shall be pursuant to a
Trust Agreement between the parties to this joint venture
and Backman Abstract & Title Company.

It is the parties intent that this Trust Agreement
provide for an easy administrative method of properly
transfering title to property when the sales price for the
same has been fully paid and for the return of title to
Parks in the event said property is not sold and/or this
joint venture is terminated as provided herein.
Due to the nature of the land purchased, seventy-five
percent (75%) of the cost of such property shall be allocated
to the Easterly one-half and twenty-five percent (25%)
allocated to the Westerly one-half.
Formen shall be responsible for carrying out the development and shall first develop and sell the lots constituting,
approximately, the Easterly one-half of the tract.

After

the completion of the development of the Easterly one-half
of the tract, the lots constituting approximately the Westerly
one-half of the project shall be developed and sold.
Formen shall be responsible for obtaining all necessary
permits and approvals and for complying with all applicable
ordinances and statutes.

To carry out the work contemplated,

Formen shall have full authority to order and pay for supplies
and materials, to negotiate subcontracts for various aspects
of the work and to assign its own employees to the project.
Formen shall not, however, allow liens of any kind to be
attached to the property as a re^ul^pf its development
activities.

ch aa lien,
i l l constitute a
The occurrence of sucn
lien, w
will
n

breach, by Formen, of t h i s Agreement, flmn^n.
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producing the same, -All sales shall be subject to inventory
control by Formen.

All sales personnel shall be subject to

and shall abide by all state and federal laws.
The minimum sales price for each parcel of property
shall be established by mutual assent of both parties.

No

sale below such mutually established price can be made
without the written consent of both parties.

All questions

..relating to the sale of more than four (4) subdivided
IparcelsMto any one purchaser shall be determined by mutual
agreement of the parties.
The minimum down payment on any lot acceptable vto the
joint venture shall be five percent (5%) of the lot price.
However, larger down payments and cash sales will be encouraged
to facilitate early return of the parties1 investments.

No

contract sale shall exceed ten (10) years of duration nor
bear an annual interest rate of less than eight percent (8%)
without the written consent of both parties.
SECTION VI
Records
Formen shall cause to be maintained a complete set of
records, statements, and accounts concerning the total
operation of the joint venture, in which shall be entered,
fully and accurately, each transaction pertaining to the
venture.

Financial statements shall be prepared quarterly.

All of the books shall be opened at all times for inspection
and examination by Parks or its agent.

SECTION VII
Alienation of Interests
Neither party may lease, sell, transfer, mortgage,
pledge, or encumber its interest herein or any assets which
is a part thereof, without the written consent of the other
party.

Any alienation or encumberance made in violation of

this provision will not be recognized, will constitute a
breach of this Agreement and shall operate to terminate the
Agreement at the option of the remaining party.
SECTION VIII
Term
This Agreement shall continue until all the parcels
of the tract have been developed and sold or otherwise
disposed of and the contract relating to the sale of the
same have been collected or until May 1, 1993, whichever is
sooner unless terminated by (1) written agreement of the
parties, (2) an unauthorized alienation of interest, (3) a
material breach of this Agreement by either party, (4)
bankruptcy or any other involuntary dissolution of Formen or
Parks, or (5) a substantial change in ownership and management of Formen.
SECTION IX
Termination
In the event of termination of this Agreement, all
liabilities of the joint venture shall be paid and all
unsold parcels and those held in default of sales contracts

shall be distributed to Parks by the trustee holding title
to the same, Cparks shall have the right to acquire the
wat^r rights pertaining to the said parcels at a price equal
to Pormenfs cost.
If there is not sufficient cash to pay the joint
venture liabilities, all loans to th§ parties shall be
called for payment equal to the needs of the venture to pay
its liabilities.

The remaining balance of the assets shall

be distributed equally to the parties.
SECTION X
Compensation
Except for the payment of sales commissions as provided
herein, no salary, fees, commissions, or other compensation
shall be paid by the venture to either party or to its
officers, agent or employees, for services rendered to the
venture or in connection with any of its business or property,
except as may be expressly agreed to in writing by both
parties.
SECTION XI
Agent or Representive
Each party shall designate in writing a representive
which shall have the authority to speak in behalf of the
said party and bind said party in decision required by this
Agreement.

Such designation may be relied on as existing

and valid unless the same is revoked in writing and the same
is received by the other party.

SECTION XII
Entire Agreement
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between
the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all other
agreements, written or oral, made at any time between the
parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused the
names of their duly authorized officers or agents to be
signed hereunder.

FORMEN CORPORATION

' '

•1

\ ^" mm'

J. Fred Smithy President
PARKS ENTERPIRSES INC.

%L P a r k s ,

By
M. Hal

S3Ws
Secretary/

££=.

S^<7A.^1.kSL

President
G^VW

Statla Jean Peterson

STATE OF UTAH
SS

COUNTY OF

)

M.

da
Y of
/"//Vy
> 1978, before me the
On this
undersigned officer;, personally appeared J* FRED SMITH,
known to me to be the President of the above named Corporation,
and that he as such officer, being authorized so to do,
executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein
set forth, by signing the name of the Corporation by him as
such officer.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
official seal.

Notary
t a r y >£&.
>££&blic
Residing at

(SEAL)

'tfn/~
itT/fetfifisrs ^orTk/

STATE OF IDAHO
)

COUNTY OF ADA

SS

)

day of
On this
. 1978, before me the
undersigned officer, personally appeared M. HAL PARKS,
known to me to be the President of the above named Corporation,
and that he, as such officer, being authorized so to do,
executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein
set forth, by signing the name of the Corporation by him as
such officer.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
official seal.

(SEAL)

Notary Public
Residing at:
-10-

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
) ss
)

On this __^__ day of
, 1978, before me the
undersigned officer, personally appeared STARLA JEAN
PETERSON, known to me to be the Secretary of the above named
corporation, and that she, as such officer, being authorized so
to do, executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein set forth, by signing the name of the corporation by her
as such officer.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
official seal.

Notary Public
Residing at:
(SEAL)

SCHEDULE

A

The land referred to in this report is situated in the
County of S a n p e t e
, State of Utah, and is described as follows:

The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, the Southeast Quarter,
and the South Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 12
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
The South Half of Section 24, Township 12 South, Range 3 East, Salt
Lake Meridian,
The North Half, and the Southwest Quarter of Section 25,
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian,

Township 12

The Northeast Quarter, the East Half of the Southeast Quarter, and the
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 26, Township 12
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
The South Half of the Southwest Quarter and the South Half of the Southeast Quarter of Section 19, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian."^
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, thence West 60 chains; thence North 20 chains; thence East
to the West line of the D. & R. G. W. RY. right of way; thence along the
West line of said right of way in a Southeasterly, Southerly and Southwesterly direction to a point 3 rods North of the South line of said
Section 20; thence East to a point 3 rods North of the point of beginning;
thence South 3 rods to the point of beginning.
Lots 1 and 2 of Section 30, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM any portion of said land which is included in the
Deed Exception described as follows:
"The area approximately 40 acres in size containing and surrounding
Hartney Lake, together with all water rights in and to the waters of said
lake, and all easements and.rights of way, including expressly a 2 rod
right of way over the lands hereinabove described for access to and egress
from said Hartney Lake, all of which were expressly reserved and
retained by George N. Phelps and H. Clyde Coon, by the terms of an Agreement
dated March 14, 1969, between George N. Phelps, Barbara Lee Phelps,
Albert M. Johnson, Frank Lundberg and Duayne T. Johnson, as "Phelps
Group"., and Capitol Finance Company, as "Capitol" and as granted to
George N. Phelps pursuant to a Right of Way Agreement executed by Capitol
Finance Company and dated March 29, 1969. Said Hartney Lake is presumed
to be located in the Southwest Quarter of-the Northeast Quarter of Section
23, Township 12 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian."

EXHIBIT "I

MEMORANDUM OF
PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is effective as of the 31st day of
December, 1980, by and between PARKS ENTERPRISES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, hereinafter referred to as "PARKS"; and
FORMAN CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred
to as "FORMAN."
WHEREAS, the parties hereto previously entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement for the subdivision, development and
sales of a recreational tract of land commonly known as Elk
Ridge Ranches near Indianola, Utah; and
WHEREAS., Forman desires to form another joint venture under
the name "Hideaway Valley" with Parks for the subdivision,
development and sale of a tract of land commonly known as the
Morgan Ballard Ranch in Sanpete County, Utah; and
WHEREAS, a deadlock has arisen between the parties hereto
as to the duties to be oerformed by the respective parties
and as to the division and sharing of the profits and losses
of the proposed Hideaway Valley Joint Venture; and
WHEREAS, the par Lies hereto now believe it to be m

the

best interest of each of them that their association with
each other be dissolved,
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties mutually agree as follows:
1.

TERMINATION OF JOINT VENTURE.

The joint

venture between the parties is hereby terminated as of the

2.

DIVISION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES.

The assets

and liabilities of the Elk Ridge Ranches Joint Vienture are
hereby divided between the parties hereto as set forth on
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof,
3,

TAX CONSEQUENCES.
3. 1

Pursuant to Tres.. Reg. 1.453-9 (c)(2),

distribution by a partnership to a partner of installment
obligations does not result in the recognition of gain or
loss to either the partnership or the partner unless Internal
Revenue Code Sections

136 and 751 apply.

Said Sections apply

to uneven distribution of unrealized receivables but do not
apply to equal distribution of unrealized ^receivables in a
partnership dissolution.

Since the Elk Ridge Ranches operation

results in a substantive amount of installment obligations and
since the parties hereto have evenly divided the assets and
liabilities of said operation, it is anticipated that there
will be no adverse tax consequences upon this dissolution of
said operation other than as provided in Internal Revenue Code
Section 731 to the extent cash received exceeds a partner's
adjusted basis in such operation before such distribution.
Any disposition of the assets received by the parties hereto
in such dissolution may, of course, result in other tax
consequences depending upon the particular circumstances
then present.
3.2

Forman was the managing venturer in said

or activities will cause dissolution to result in any adverse
tax consequences not contemplated above or will result in
any adverse tax consequences

not previously reported to the

appropriate tax authorities for either the Elk Ridge Ranches
or Hideaway Valley ventures, then all such adverse tax
consequences will be for all purposes the sole responsibility
of Forman and Forman shall indemnify and hold Parks harmless
from any and all such adverse tax consequences and any further
adverse tax consequences .caused by such adverse tax consequences
being the sole responsibility of Forman.

The phrase "adverse

tax consequences'1 shall include all taxes, interest and
penalties imposed.
4.

ENTIRE AGREEMENT.

This Agreement contains the

entire agreement between the parties and modifies and supercedes
all prior written or oral agreements between them.
5.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS APPROVAL.

Each of the

parties hereto have previously had this Agreement approved
by their respective Boards of Directors.
6.

FULL DISCLOSURE.

Each party hereto has fully

disclosed to the other all information which would be pertinent
to such party in making its decision to enter into this Agreement:.
7.

SEVERABILITY.

Any provision of this Agreement

which shall prove to be invalid, void or illegal shall in no
way affect, impair or invalidate any other provision hereof,
and the remaining provisions shall, nevertheless, remain in

8.

SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST.

be binding upon the successors,

This Agreement shall

assigns, directors, officers

and shareholders of the parties hereto.
9.

ATTORNEYS' FEES.

In the event that a party

hereto places this Agreement with an attorney for enforcement
or if suit be instituted for its enforcement, the other party
agrees to pay, in either case, reasonable attorneys1 fees.
The parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the
day and year first above written.
PARKS ENTERPRISES, INC.

EXHIBIT "A"
DIVISION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES.
USING FAIR MARKET VALUES
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Fair Mkt. Value Acreage
$

Parks Enterprises, Inc.
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Lot #

Forman Corporation
Fair Mkt. Value Acreage

Parks Enterprises, Inc.
Fair Mkt. Value
Acreage
$

7,144.03
9,032.38
8,333.88
10.0

5,773.17
9.8
15,725.00
17,018.04
8,116.09
8,850.23
8,196.25
9,672:57
14,689.04
f
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8,782.82
8,925.00
10,696.02
7 ,862.50
16,873.24
9,445.47
9,274.57
17,244.87
14,450.00
15,709.30
10,253.20
9,588.61
14 ,9 8?, .87
7,348.83
9,200.47
12,116.08
18,595.00

5.0
690.76
638,12

7,793.77
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Forman Corporation
Fair Mkt. Value
Acreage
$

Parks Enterprises, Inc
Fair Mkt. Value
Acre:

9,334.49
8,907.85
13,454.23
14,113.37
8,976.60
10,025.01
8,800.39
6,705.00
14,344.71
15,725.00
3,465.51
14,067.50
7, 708.07
7,708.87
15,450.00
19,528.81
8,660.50
10.0
16,086.51
12,732.62

$634,674.30J

42.30

39

Consists of contracts, lots and sales proceeds from sale of contracts
Consists of contracts and lots.

Total
The cash is divided
equally
Notes payable
Customers Deposits

Forman
Corporation

Parks
Ent:erprises,

$ 56.33

$ 28.17

$ 28.16

80.30

40.15

4 0.15

177.54

88.77

88. 77

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, FOR:
1

2
3

ijL*£\

HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 EAST 3 0 0 NORTH STREET
P O BOX 778
PROVO UTAH 8 4 6 0 3
TELEPHONE 373-634S

4 Attorneys for Defendant
5
6

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

7 FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH, and

8 FRED SMITH,
9
10

Plaintiffs,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
COUNTERCLAIM ON
FORECLOSURE DEFENDANTS

VS.

11 MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISE,
INC./ an Idaho corporation,
12 NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a parntership, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY TAYLOR,

13 his wife, LARRY ANDERSON, HAL
PARKS, JERRY PARKS, STARLA
14 PETERSON aka STARLA PARKS, BRYCE
AVERILL, HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER,

15 ELZA HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS
GENE REID, MARY REID, his wife,
16 WANDA HOPPER, PARKS & SONS
SANITATION, INC./ a Utah corpora-

17 tion, PARKS & SONS INTERMOUNTAIN,
INC./ an Idaho Corporation/ and
18 JOHN DOES I through X,
19
20
21

Civil No. 8579

Defendants.

TtL -^=- 1 _.

. »£_;_

The defendants' "Motion for Summary Judgment on [Counterclaim]

22 of Foreclosure Defendants/" filed on behalf of defendants Bryce

23 Averill, Harry Keith Huffaker, Elza Huffaker, Thomas Gene Reid, and
24 Mar Reid, came on before the above entitled Court for hearing on

562

1 the 21st day of December/ 1983/.

The moving defendants were not

2 present/ but were represented by their attorneys/ Jackson Howard
3 and Leslie W. Slaugh.

J. Fred Smith/ president of the Foremen Corp-

4 oration/ was present and Formen Corporation was represented by its
5 attorney/ Lowell V. Summerhays.

The Court having heard arguments/

6 and having reviewed the memoranda submitted by both parties, and
7 having determined that there is no dispute as to any material issue
8 of fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
9 of law/ now hereby makes and enters the following judgment:
<n in
I (A
OS
I I 00 «• »

o xIn
Z mo <
O ^u

sooi
H Q. > 0.

O

10

1.

Bryce Averill is awarded judgment against Formen Corpora-

11 tion in the sum of $2/549.00/ together with prejudgment interest in
12 the amount of $612.68/ for a total of $3,161.68.
13

2.

Thomas Gene Reid and Mary Gene Reid are granted judgment

14 against Formen Corporation in the sum of ff,fr^Wi.-T^, together with
15 prejudgment interest in the amount of $496.70/ for a total of
16 $2,582.45.
17

3.

Harry Keith Huffaker and Elza Huffaker are granted judg-

18 ment against Formen Corporation in the sum of $3,022.36, together
19 with prejudgment interest in the amount of $759.78, for a total of
20 $3,782.14.
21

4.

Interest shall accrue on these judgments at the rate of

22 12% per annum from the date of entry.
23 /////
24 /////

-
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DATED

thiaaaSjX'I!C&VA

4
5
6
7

fcJftG CERTIFICATE
I hereby cW&gjjj^j^'t I mailed a copy of the foregoing Summary

8 Judgment on Counterclaim on Foreclosure Defendants to Lowell V.

<
-I

9 Summerhays/ 420 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
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